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The first of three essays  assesses the performance of U.S. equity funds over 45 
years using the stochastic discount factor (SDF) approach. We test the applicability of 
nine candidate models for describing the pricing kernel, and use these pricing kernels to 
test whether fund managers can earn abnormal risk-adjusted returns for their unitholders. 
The Carhart model yields the smallest pricing errors under the conditional setting and is 
the appropriate pricing kernel specification based on the Hansen-Jagannathan boundary 
test. The percentage of abnormal average alphas is very low overall and is the highest 
using the CAPM-based pricing kernel. Robustness tests confirm the superiority of the 
Carhart model and show that the ranking of the candidates depends on the choice of the 
investment opportunity set. 
In the second essay, we study M&A activity in the US mutual fund industry over 
the period 1962-2009. Any improvement in abnormal performance around M&As 
accrues primarily to target unitholders. The risk level of acquirers increases around such 
transactions. An analysis of the risk-return trade-offs finds that low levels of risk do not 
yield greater mean-variance efficient portfolios after merger, but that higher levels of risk 
are associated with a loss in asset allocation efficiency for unit holders in the acquirer. 
The analysis of success determinants finds that the target’s prior performance, bidder’s 
 iv 
risk post-M&A and an indicator of market state are significant determinants of the 
potential success of such M&As.  
The third and final essay examines the relation between net fund flows and 
performance around the two most recent U.S. economic recessions for U.S. equity funds. 
Post-recessionary period net fund flows are positively (negatively) correlated with 
absolute (peer-relative) performance for the Early 2000 recession, and with absolute and 
peer-relative performance for the Great Recession (the most recent one) according to 
non-parametric measures. Empirical copulas in the extreme left tails indicate a positive 
dependence for the Early 2000 Recession, and independence for the Great Recession 
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 According to the 2011 Investment Company Fact Book, the total net assets (TNA) of 
US mutual funds grew from about $17 billion in 1960 to about $12 trillion in 2010 and 
the respective number of funds grew from 161 to 7,581. Fund flows varied over time and 
ranged between aggregate net sales of $884 billion in 2007 and aggregate net 
redemptions of $282 billion in 2010. In 2010, the US mutual fund industry had a 
predominance of equity funds with $5.7 trillion of TNA, compared to $2.6 trillion for 
bond funds, $2.8 trillion for money market funds and $0.7 trillion for hybrid funds. 
Hence, the exponential growth of US mutual funds, and the substantial time-variation in 
net fund flows in the industry lead to three central questions: (1) Are there outperforming 
active fund managers in the US market? (2) Does consolidation in the mutual fund 
industry lead to better asset allocation in a mean-variance context? (3) Is there a 
consistent relationship between performance and fund flows around recessionary 
periods?  
 In chapter 2 (essay 1), we provide an answer to the first question by examining the 
performance of equity US mutual funds over a 45 year period using the stochastic 
discount factor approach (SDF thereafter). The technical advantages of the SDF 
framework consist in relaxing the assumption that the distribution of error terms is 
normal that is imposed in a multivariate linear regression, and the alleviation of the biases 
due to errors-in-variables stemming from double-stage estimations à la Fama-McBeth. 
The conceptual advantages of the SDF approach consist in bypassing the step of picking 
the “right” mean-variance efficient benchmark. According to Cochrane (2005), if the 
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SDF prices the investment opportunity set, then financial markets are efficient. Therefore, 
we use Hansen’s (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) in order to estimate the 
parameters of the evaluation model and the risk-adjusted returns for over 14,000 US 
equity funds for the period starting in 1962 and ending in 2006. We estimate the 
abnormal performance (SDF alpha) for nine benchmark models and test the weak and 
semi-strong forms of the US market efficiency hypothesis using both unconditional and 
conditional performance measures. 
 Our study extends the studies by Dahlquist and Söderlind (1999), Farnsworth et al. 
(2002), and others, by estimating SDF parameters in a mutual fund performance context 
over almost a half century of data. Furthermore, we examine the existence of abnormal 
returns from active management for nine different SDF candidates (Capital Asset Pricing 
Model or CAPM, 3-factor Fama-French, 4-factor Carhart or Momentum, Labor-CAPM, 
Arbitrage Price Theory or APT, Cubic, Quadratic, Labor-Cubic, Labor-Quadratic). Our 
work also extends that of Fletcher and Forbes (2004) by applying the benchmark models 
to U.S. equity and bond mutual funds (and not U.K. unit trusts) as well as allowing for 
time-variation of the SDF coefficients when measuring conditional risk-adjusted returns.  
 Thus, this first essay makes four contributions to the mutual fund literature. First, the 
three highest ranked models based on Hansen-Jagannathan (H-J) distances (first ranking 
criterion) in descending order of appropriateness are the Carhart model, the APT model 
and the Cubic, with the CAPM model in the ninth rank under both settings (conditional 
and unconditional). Second, the three highest ranked models based on the Hansen-
Jagannathan (H-J) boundaries (second ranking criterion) in descending order of 
appropriateness are the four-factor Carhart model, the three-factor Fama-French 
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(henceforth FF) model and the Labor-Cubic model, and ending with the APT under the 
unconditional setting. Conditioning results in minor changes in ranking. Third, the three 
highest ranked of the nine candidate models based on average absolute pricing errors 
(third ranking criterion) in descending order of appropriateness are the CAPM, the FF 
model and the Carhart model under both settings. Finally, the three highest ranked 
models based on the percentage of significant alphas (fourth ranking criterion) in 
descending order of appropriateness are the Carhart, Labor-Quadratic and Labor-Cubic 
models, with the Labor-CAPM and CAPM model in the eighth and ninth ranks for both 
settings.  
 To answer the second question, we study combinations between US mutual funds 
(equity, bond, money market, hybrid or asset allocation and convertibles) in chapter 3 
(essay 2). This study provides insight about the Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A 
thereafter) activity in the US mutual fund industry over a 48-year period starting in 1962 
and ending in 2009. We consider the two central variables inherent to an investment 
decision: performance and risk. The conditional abnormal returns using the four-factor 
Carhart (1997) model within the SDF framework for the target and the acquiring funds 
are used to proxy managerial performance around a M&A, and the semi-variance of fund 
returns is used as the proxy for a measure of downside risk.  
 This essay extends the Jayaraman et al. (2002) study by examining the determinants 
of mutual fund success in lieu of the forces driving their occurrence. The success odds are 
based on the outperformance of the funds post-M&A, and the explanatory variables 
considered in a logistic regression include the ages of the target and acquiring funds at 
transaction dates to proxy for their reputations, the sizes of the bidder and the target fund, 
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the past performance of the target fund, the average MER of the bidder and the target, the 
average net asset flow for the target prior to the M&A, dummy bull/bear market 
indicators to proxy for the timing of the deal, the Investment Style (hereafter IS) of the 
target and merger type (within vs. across-IS and within vs. across-family).  
 We find that the abnormal performance improvement around the M&As primarily 
benefits target unitholders, but that the increase in risk post-M&A is incompatible with a 
significantly higher abnormal performance. Fund risk increases post-M&A for the 
unitholders of acquirers and is unchanged for unitholders of targets. The latter finding is 
consistent with the continuity or smooth transition hypothesis. The mean-variance 
efficiency of high-risk bidder funds deteriorates while that of low-risk bidder funds 
remains unchanged. Thus, M&As only affect unitholders of high-risk bidder funds 
adversely. The window of opportunity and smooth transition hypotheses are supported 
since the target’s reputation (as proxied by its age), target’s size and timing of the deal 
are significantly related to prospective post-M&A outperformance.  
 To answer the third question, we study the relationship between performance and net 
fund flows around recessions in chapter 4 (essay 3). The occurrence of downturns in the 
US economy has been more frequent since the beginning of the 21
st
 century. This is a 
reason for focusing on recessionary periods when examining the dependence of post-
recession fund flows to/from equity mutual funds and the during-recession performance 
of fund managers. We consider only the funds investing in equity assets because they are 
the major category in terms of assets under management (AUM) in the US market, and 
since they are considered as being more risky than bond or money market funds. 
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 In this third essay, we examine the relationship between the two variables, net fund 
flows and performance, over their whole distributions, and over their lower and upper 
tails separately. For this purpose we examine correlations (parametric and non-
parametric) and use the copulas method (Gaussian, Student t and empirical). We also 
estimate empirical survival copulas to cover the right tails of the distributions of the two 
variables.  
 The third essay contributes to the literature by examining the behavior of net fund 
flows and fund performances using the copulas method around two recent economic 
recessions in the U.S., namely the Early 2000 Recession (the Dotcom crisis) and the 
Great Recession (the Subprime crisis). Since the investment behavior of individual 
investors cannot be linked to any sophisticated risk-adjusted performance measure, we 
consider both absolute and objective-adjusted monthly returns and fund flows. 
 Our major findings in the third essay show significant differences between both 
recessionary periods and for both return and fund flows measures. First, the Early 2000 
Recession yields a positive correlation between during-recessionary period absolute 
returns and post-recessionary period absolute fund flows and a negative linear 
dependence between their objective-adjusted counterparts. This suggests that higher 
performance during downturns is rewarded by subsequent higher money flows on an 
absolute basis, and that investors direct less net cash flow to outperformers on a peer-
relative basis. On both an absolute and relative basis, performance positively impacts 
post-Great Recession fund flows according to the non-parametric measures. Second, the 
extreme left and right regions of the tails of the peer-relative distributions are associated 
with negative dependence for both recessionary periods. Median Gaussian, and Student t, 
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copulas for the absolute variables show a positive (negative) dependence in the 1% left 
(right) tail for the Early 2000 Recession. The right and left 1% tail dependence for the 
Great Recession is positive. Empirical copulas in the extreme left tail exhibit a positive 
dependence for the Early 2000 Recession, and independence for the Great Recession, 
between performance and net cash flow. Third, survival copulas show an overall positive 
dependence on an absolute basis and a negative dependence on an objective-adjusted 
basis in the right region of the marginal distributions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PERFORMANCE OF U.S. EQUITY MUTUAL FUNDS USING THE 




The performance of mutual funds remains an important research problem since 
the economic size of the industry has grown exponentially since the 1980s. About 90 
million Americans own mutual funds and total mutual fund assets reached almost $13 
trillion as of year-end 2010.
1
 Moreover, mutual fund units are available for large-scale 
purchases or redemptions on a daily basis, with very negligible execution costs since they 
are marked-to-market at the close of each day and are traded at the NAVPS of the day.
2
 
The theory of efficient markets states that even expert investors are not able to 
exploit mispricing or profit from free lunches. In such markets, portfolio managers should 
not be able to outperform relevant benchmarks to register abnormal returns for the funds 
they manage. This statement casts doubt on the raison-d’être of active management and 
the viability of non-indexed mutual funds. Since the middle of the last century, 
researchers have investigated the extent to which portfolio managers are able to take 
advantage of asset mispricings by constructing strategies that result in net positive 
abnormal performance. The issue is still unresolved although models have been further 
refined to delimit the possible risk sources that explain the cross-section of financial asset 
returns.  
                                                 
1





 NAVPS is Net Asset Value Per Share or the weighted average of the market values of securities 
composing the portfolio at the close of the market minus any fund liabilities, divided by the number of fund 
shares.  
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Early studies evaluate performance using beta-pricing models. The well-known 
Jensen’s alpha relies on the Sharpe-Lintner (1964-1965) CAPM as the “true” model 
specification for pricing assets. However, empirical implementations of the unconditional 
CAPM using a stock market index as the proxy for the mean-variance efficient market 
portfolio suggest that this model may not best describe the cross-variation of average 
stock returns. The need to better explain expected returns has led to the inclusion of 
numerous variables as potential sources of risk in the return generating process. 
According to Fama and French (1992), the ICAPM of Merton (1973) was the “fishing 
license” that allowed asset-pricing models to be structured as multi-factor models.  
To include presumably priced risk factors, there is a need to associate financial 
market movements with macroeconomic events. As stocks returns are deemed to be 
higher in “good” times and lower in “bad” times, expected returns should be related to or 
driven by changing economic conditions as captured by macroeconomic factors. The 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model is the first popular asset-pricing model that fulfils 
the condition that the added factors are part of the aggregate wealth in the economy. Liew 
and Vassalou (2000) find that value (HML or high minus low) and size (SMB or small 
minus big) are significant explanatory variables of future output growth (i.e., of business 
cycles). In contrast, the momentum-related risk factor added by Carhart (1997) to obtain 
his four-factor model has no apparent macroeconomic grounding although its addition 
helps to explain the momentum anomaly. 
A number of other sources of risk are proposed to more accurately price stocks. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) find that human capital should be taken into account when 
explaining variations in expected stock returns. Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Dittmar 
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(2002) find that investors also incorporate coskewness and cokurtosis as factors when 
pricing securities. As researchers search for new risk variables to better describe expected 
stock return cross-variations, the problem of data snooping becomes a real issue. Thus, an 
economic explanation for factors helping to shape the distribution of securities’ returns 
may be found, without being influential out of the sample used in the study. Furthermore, 
Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) argue that survivorship bias exists in the data used to 
test the multi-factor linear pricing models.  
The stochastic discount factor (hereafter SDF) formulation is considered as a 
competing paradigm to beta pricing formulations for empirical work in asset pricing. 
Under the same distributional assumptions, the GMM approach within the SDF 
framework and multivariate regression approach are equivalent when the same moments 
are estimated. Nevertheless, the GMM method is more attractive than the latter to 
estimate “true” risk-adjusted fund returns. First, the GMM relies on weaker construction 
conditions since there is no need to hypothesize about the distributions followed by the 
pricing errors. Second, the multifactor models rely on strong assumptions such as the 
rationality and the efficiency of markets. According to Cochrane (2005), pricing is 
undeniably rational if the SDF mirrors the macroeconomic conditions correctly, where 
Arrow-Debreu prices of securities reflect the economy state. If the SDF approach prices 
the assets in the investment opportunity set, then financial markets are efficient, 
regardless of the choice of benchmarks and their mean-variance efficiency. Furthermore, 
Söderlind (1999) shows that a portfolio performance measure equivalent to Jensen’s 
alpha is obtained using a Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) SDF that is a linear 
combination of individual returns. 
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We begin by investigating the performance of individual U.S. equity mutual funds 
between January 1962 and June 2006 relative to nine benchmark models within the SDF 
framework. Our study is related to Dahlquist and Söderlind (1999) and Farnsworth et al. 
(2002) in that we estimate SDF parameters to measure fund performance. Our work 
differs from their work in terms of study period, and choice of SDF candidates for testing 
the existence of abnormal returns from active management. While our work is close to 
that of Fletcher and Forbes (2004), we apply our models to U.S. equity mutual funds and 
not U.K. unit trusts, and we do allow the SDF coefficients to vary over time when we 
measure conditional risk-adjusted returns. We test the ability of each SDF candidate, 
which is related to an asset-pricing model, to provide neutral performance when no 
managerial ability is at play.  
This paper has four major findings. First, the three highest ranked models based 
on Hansen-Jagannathan (HJ) distances (first ranking criterion) in descending order of 
appropriateness are the Carhart model, the APT model and the Cubic, with the CAPM 
model in the ninth rank under both settings (conditional and unconditional). Second, the 
three highest ranked models based on the Hansen-Jagannathan (HJ) boundaries (second 
ranking criterion) in descending order of appropriateness are the four-factor Carhart 
model, the three-factor Fama-French (henceforth FF) model and the Labor-Cubic model, 
and ending with the APT under the unconditional setting. Conditioning results in minor 
changes in ranking. Third, the three highest ranked of the nine candidate models based on 
average absolute pricing errors (third ranking criterion) in descending order of 
appropriateness are the CAPM, the FF model and the Carhart model under both settings. 
Finally, the three highest ranked models based on the percentage of significant alphas 
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(fourth ranking criterion) in descending order of appropriateness are the Carhart, Labor-
Quadratic and Labor-Cubic models, with the Labor-CAPM and CAPM model in the 
eighth and ninth ranks for both settings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
introduce the SDF approach and describe the need for the generalized method of 
moments in the general asset pricing framework. In the third section, we present the 
methodology of mutual fund performance using the SDF approach and the ten candidate 
models for the SDF. In the fourth section, we describe the mutual fund sample and the 
data used herein. In the fifth section, we present and discuss our empirical results. In the 
sixth section, we report the results of robustness tests. We conclude with a summary of 
our findings and their implications. 
2.2. STOCHASTIC DISCOUNT FACTOR APPROACH 
2.2.1 The Stochastic Discount Factor  
Asset-pricing models are based on two central concepts: the no-arbitrage principle 
and/or financial market equilibrium. The theorems of Harrison and Pliska (1981) provide 
the foundation for the law-of-one-price evaluation method based on the seminal work of 
Harrison-Kreps (1979). Harrison-Kreps show that there is a price process of an 
admissible investment strategy that is compatible with market equilibrium, if and only if, 
there is a martingale for some equivalent probability measure when appropriately 
normalized. In the absence of arbitrage, the equilibrium price of an asset equals the 
expectation of its discounted future values using risk-neutral probabilities.  
According to Harrison and Kreps (1979), the general asset-pricing (GAP) model 
requires rather weak market conditions of either the law of one price or the no arbitrage 
principle. The GAP model implies the canonical asset-pricing equation according to 
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which any gross return discounted by a market-wide random variable has a constant 
conditional expectation: the pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor. 
In an Arrow-Debreu economy, the SDF constitutes the state-price density and 
reflects the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the CCAPM. The SDF is called 
the marginal value of wealth or a “hunger” measure for wealth by Cochrane (2005). 
SDFs are positively related with economic conditions. 
2.2.2 The GAP Framework and Mutual Fund Performance 
The SDF approach is used to measure portfolio performance given its equivalence 
to factor pricing models and its weaker distributional assumptions on the pricing errors. 
The use of GMM to estimate all parameters simultaneously avoids the errors-in-variables 
problem associated with the traditional regression method. The system consists of all 
relevant orthogonality moment conditions to reflect the mean-variance efficient frontier 
in financial markets,
3
 augmented with a similar condition applied to the fund (or funds) 
of interest. If the pricing errors of the fund, on average, are neutral, then the fund belongs 
to the portfolio frontier. Otherwise, the fund either expands the frontier when positive, or 
leads to a sub-optimal combination of individual assets when negative.  
Söderlind (1999) shows that the estimation of mutual fund performance under the 
(un)conditional GAP framework is related to the metric introduced by Jensen (1968) to 
measure stock-picking ability. Thus, when we apply the SDF approach, we estimate a 
modified Jensen alpha while avoiding a potential bias from market timing and the 
econometric errors that may occur with linear estimation. The unconditional SDF-based 
measure is used to test the average performance of portfolio managers after controlling 
                                                 
3
 The pricing kernel is assumed to price all assets on the market at equilibrium. Hence, there is no need to 
specify a mean-variance efficient frontier. Empirically, the latter is proxied by a number of benchmark 
strategies (hereafter primitive assets) that are deemed to encompass all investment opportunities available 
to investors and reflect the dynamics of the financial asset universe. 
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for the impact of the economy on their trading strategies. The conditional measure is used 
to test the ability of managers to better use publicly available information to generate 
returns that outperform naive trading strategies based on the same information set.  
2.3. METHODOLOGY 
According to Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981, 1983), 
there is a martingale equivalent measure in equilibrium that prices all financial securities, 
such that: 
  011  ttt rmE  (1) 
where Et is the conditional expectation operator; mt+1 is the future pricing kernel 
prevailing at t+1 given the information set at time t, and rt+1 is the excess return on the 
risky versus risk-free asset at time t+1. To implement this fundamental pricing model, 
we: (i) use sample analogs instead of the population moments; (ii) measure ex-post first 
moments of discounted fund returns rather than ex-ante moments conditional on the 
available information set; and (iii) estimate expectations over time and not over states of 
the world. Hence, we apply the law of iterated expectations assuming that asset returns 
are random variables measurable on the probability space (Ω,F,Ft,P), and constant on the 
atoms of the sub-σ-algebras Ft. The canonical equation becomes:  
     01111   ttttt rmEErmE  (2) 
2.3.1 Setup 
When applied to mutual fund performance measurement, the GMM system 
involving equilibrium pricing equations and instrumental variables
tZ  becomes:  
  0|11  ttt ZrmE  (3) 
 
ptptt ZrmE  |11  (4) 
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where mt+1 is the pricing kernel, rt+1 is the vector of N primitive asset excess returns at 
time t+1, rpt+1 is the mutual fund excess return, and αp is the average unconditional 
abnormal performance of the fund when 
tZ  is a constant, and average conditional 
performance when 
tZ  is a set of economy-reflecting variables. According to the semi-
strong from of market efficiency (Fama, 1971, 1998), the average conditional alpha must 
be neutral, even if the unconditional abnormal return is positive. Trading rules that 
respond mechanically to economic readings and historical return patterns should not 
obtain significant positive risk-adjusted rewards. However, if the average conditional 
alpha is significantly positive, this provides evidence that active managers can use 
economic variables to forecast risk-adjusted returns that outperform appropriate 
benchmarks. 
When the general pricing framework is based on excess rather than gross returns, 
the model is not constrained to price rates of return on a discounting security (the 
numéraire). As a result, the inverse of the gross risk-free return is assigned to the mean of 
the SDF: E (mt+1|Zt)=1/Rf,t. If the pricing errors are denoted by ft+1, then the system 
becomes: 
1( ) 0t tE f Z   (5) 
where 
1 1
1 1 , 1
1 ,1/
t t















The mimicking portfolio makes the portfolio-based descriptions of the marginal 
value of wealth a more legitimate method with regard to its effectiveness in performance 
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evaluation. According to Cochrane (2005),
4
 the mimicking portfolio theorem states that if 
we assume that the pricing kernel is a linear function and the model is well-specified, 
then we can work with a mimicking portfolio resulting from the regression of the SDF on 
asset returns. This mimicking portfolio will work better in sample and in practice using 
the better-measured data for asset returns than that for consumption-related variables. 
Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2005) show that the performance statistics and 
inferences are sensitive to the kernel specification model, when estimating performance 
under the same framework. Thus, we measure the relative effectiveness of nine candidate 
models to reflect economic conditions and to price the IO set in order to identify the best 
performing models for assessing mutual fund performance using the GMM method (in 
the spirit of Fletcher and Forbes, 2004; and Farnsworth et al., 2002). 
We investigate the predictability of asset returns by assessing conditional 
performances. We translate the co-variation of the SDFs and the risk factors by the 
inclusion of lagged short-term interest rates (Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Kryzanowski et 
al., 1997; Ayadi and Kryzanowski, 2005).
5
 Empirically, we choose to account for 
instrumental variables using the linear method as in Cochrane (1996) and we impose the 
time-variability of factor coefficients to reflect variability in risk and excess returns. 
2.3.2 Candidate SDF Specifications 
CAPM. Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) show that the Sharpe-Lintner model is 
equivalent to the SDF model when the pricing kernel is a linear function of the excess 
returns on the market portfolio, rmt, as follows: 
                                                 
4
 According to Cochrane (2005), the linear function of mimicking portfolios for some economic risks is a 
plausible alternative for the more common ratio of intertemporal levels of consumption (e.g., the 
consumption-CAPM). 
5
 Due to saturation ratio considerations, we do not include the dividend yield of the equity index as an 
instrumental variable (see Appendix A). 
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      mtttt rzbzam 11    (6) 
where zt-1 is a vector of information variables (ones) in an (un)conditional setting. 
Labor-CAPM. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) broaden the market portfolio to 
account for the growth in per capita labour income 
ltr  to proxy for the human capital 
factor since salary and wages represent a major part of the U.S. economy. The SDF 
specification based on the Labor-CAPM is as follows:  
  
 1 1 , ,( ) ( )t t t m t l tm a z b z r r     (7) 
FF and Carhart Models. The FF model acquired legitimacy among empirical 
researchers because the size and value factors (
,smb tr and ,hml tr , respectively) may 
correspond to a plausible measure of the marginal utility of wealth (Cochrane, 2005). 
Carhart (1997) accounts for return persistence by adding the momentum risk factor 
,wml tr to the FF model to obtain: 
  
 1 1 , , , ,( ) ( )t t t m t smb t hml t wml tm a z b z r r r r     (8) 
Four-factor APT. We implement the APT model of Ross (1976) by using 
mimicking portfolios for four predetermined risk factors: residual market portfolio return 
( ,mres tr ); term structure ( ,term tr ); unexpected change in industrial output ( ,prod tr ) (Breeden, 
1979); and unexpected change in inflation ( inf,tr ) (Chan, Foresi and Lang, 1996). 
Specifically: 
  
 1 1 , , , inf,( ) ( )t t t mres t term t prod t tm a z b z r r r r     (9) 
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Quadratic kernel. Harvey and Siddique (2000) find that coskewness commands a 
significant risk premium. Hence, the quadratic pricing kernel, which is consistent with 
the three-moment or quadratic-CAPM, is formulated as: 
 
 21 1 , ,( ) ( )t t t m t m tm a z b z r r     (10) 
Cubic kernel. This model adds a cubic term beyond the linear and quadratic ones 
to capture cokurtosis (Dittmar, 2002) in order to account for the investor preference for 
thin- compared to heavy-tailed asset return distributions. This model is formulated as:  
 
 2 31 1 , , ,( ) ( )t t t m t m t m tm a z b z r r r     (11) 
Quadratic and Cubic LCAPMs. Dittmar (2002) allows for nonlinearities in the 
human capital factor and finds that it substantially improves the pricing kernel’s ability to 
describe the cross-section of returns. When the third moment of labor income growth, 
which reflects the price of systematic skewness of the human-capital component within 
aggregate wealth, is included the quadratic LCAPM pricing kernel specification is: 
  
 2 21 1 , , , ,( ) ( )t t t m t l t m t l tm a z b z r r r r     (12) 
When the high kurtosis of the return on labor compared to that on the market 
return is captured by including the fourth moment of returns on the human capital factor 
(Dittmar, 2002), the SDF specification becomes:  
  
 2 2 3 31 1 , , , , , ,( ) ( )t t t m t l t m t l t m t l tm a z b z r r r r r r     (13) 
2.3.3 Estimation Method and Statistical Tests 
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The first moment of model conditions is estimated using sample averages over the 
study period.
6













   (14) 
where T is the number of pricing errors in the time series and N is the number of 
primitive assets under consideration. The number of parameters in the model, p, is driven 
by the restrictions on the SDF specification. In the linear three-factor case, p=3×(K+1)+1, 
where K is one (zero) in the (un)conditional setting. 
Hansen’s (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) is used to test the 
hypothesized neutral performance of mutual funds. We estimate the model parameters 
and test the overidentifying orthogonality conditions simultaneously using the 
minimization of the function of the weighted squared pricing errors. We assess the 
iterated GMM estimator given its superior finite sample properties compared to the 
standard estimator (Ferson and Foerster, 1994).  
Hansen (1982) has established that the GMM estimators are optimal if a 
consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the sample analogs of 
moment conditions is used. We followed Newey and West (1994) and estimate the 
spectral density matrix at frequency zero of sample averages of pricing errors. This 
                                                 
6
 The general equilibrium exists if the discounted asset return is a martingale difference sequence. Also, the 
GMM distribution theory requires that the SDF, the asset prices and the payoffs must be stationary random 
variables so that sample averages converge to population means. Consequently, we tested the stationarity of 
the primitive assets as well as the mutual funds time series of monthly returns (Cochrane, 2001).  Using the 
Dickey-Fuller limiting distributions at the 95% confidence level, we find a percentage of equity funds 
whose return series are cointegrated of 2.07% (or 310 funds out of 14,996). All 10 industry-sorted portfolio 
returns series are stationary using the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. The Phillips-Perron correction for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity yields slightly different figures with a percentage of 2.09% for equity 
funds. 
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weighting matrix has been proven to be positive, semi-definite and a consistent estimator 
since it accounts for heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation within the moment 
condition time series. Larger weights are assigned to low-order lagged autocorrelation 
terms to reflect a greater impact of closer autocorrelations than further ones. We test the 
classical weighting schemes used to estimate spectral density matrices using three kernel 
types: Bartlett window (Newey and West, 1987), Parzen window (Gallant, 1987) and 
Quadratic Spectral kernel (Andrews, 1991). 
We impose an additional condition on the estimation system which is the 
positivity of the SDF in both the unconditional and conditional versions of the model. 
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) argue that the absence of arbitrage opportunities 
(nonnegative payoffs with negative prices) imposes positivity on the SDF almost surely 
in a conditional asset-pricing model (Dahlquist and Söderlind, 1999, p. 352). Our 
objective is to ensure a maximum level of accuracy in both the SDF and the abnormal 
performance estimates. 
2.4. SAMPLE OF FUNDS AND DATA COLLECTION 
2.4.1  Mutual Fund Dataset 
Our sample consists of all 14,996 alive, dead and surviving U.S. open-ended 
equity funds drawn from the CRSP survivorship-bias free mutual fund database with 
regularly-reported monthly returns in the period from January 1962 through June 2006.
7
 
Whether a fund is an equity fund is based on the not fully-revealing objective codes 
provided by Wiesenberger for funds from 1962 to 1990, the widened set of Wiesenberger 
                                                 
7
 Alive and dead funds are those that started up before May 2006 and were and were not still operating as 
of June 2006, respectively. Surviving funds are those that were alive over the full evaluation period. 
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objective codes from 1991 to 1993, and the S&P codes (or in their absence the ICDI 
codes) thereafter.
8 
Changes in investment objectives are treated as fund terminations. 
Monthly mutual fund returns are net of management fees and adjusted for 
dividend or interest distributions, but are gross of commissions, front-end and back-end 
loads. Their excess returns are calculated using the total returns on 30-day U.S. Treasury 
Bills available from the Ibbotson Associates database.
9
 
2.4.2 Investment Opportunity (IO) Set of Primitive Assets 
The investment opportunity (IO) set of primitive assets initially is proxied by ten 
value-weighted industry portfolios: Consumer Nondurables, Consumer Durables, 
Manufacturing, Energy, HiTech Business Equipment, Telecom, Shops, Health, Utilities 
and Others (e.g., Mines, Hotels, Entertainment, Finance, etc.). The excess portfolio 
returns over those for 30-day U.S. Treasury Bills are obtained from the “Kenneth French 
data library”.  
2.4.3 Risk Factors and Information Variables
10 
The value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks from 
CRSP is used as the proxy for the market portfolio. The previous month’s growth in the 
two-month moving average of labour income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is 
used as the proxy for the human capital return.
11
 We also use the continuously 
compounded growth rate of the U.S. industrial production index available from the U.S. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the monthly change in the CPI-U 
                                                 
8
 Information for fund style is missing for a number of funds. When it was possible to infer fund style or 
investment objective from information on asset holdings, we added the fund to our sample. This process 
resulted in the addition of 147 funds to the sample.  
9
 The U.S. T-bill index is extracted from the Wall Street Journal for 1977-2007, and is the CRSP U.S. 
government bond file for 1926-1976.  
10
 See Table 1 for simple statistics for the data series for the risk factors. 
11
 As in Jagannathan and Wang (1996), a lagged variable is used since labour information is released with a 
one-month delay. Labour income is the difference between personal and dividend income, all divided by 
the population size, as reported in a table in the National Income and Product Account section. 
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index (Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers) available from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Term structure is measured by the difference in returns of the U.S. 
long-term government bond index and 30-day T-bills. 
To form mimicking portfolios for the industrial production and inflation factors in 
the APT model, the sample realizations of statistical factors are first identified by 
estimating the first five eigenvectors of the cross-products matrix of the cross-section of 
returns on all securities traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ over the study period 
(Connor & Korajczyk, 1986, 1988; Ferson & Korajczyk, 1995). The economic shocks 
(demeaned risk factors) are then regressed on the five demeaned eigenvectors. The 
resulting coefficients from the rotational matrix are then multiplied by the original 
eigenvectors to get the mimicking portfolio excess returns that proxy for industrial 
production and inflation risk sources.  
The size and value factors are based on self-financing portfolios sorted by market 
capitalization (SMB) and book-to-market ratios (HML). The momentum factor (WML) is 
based on zero-net investment portfolios long in winners and short in losers. These three 
factors are obtained from the “Kenneth French data library”.  
As one test of robustness, we implement the four-index model as in Elton et al. 
(1999) and Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2008), where the factors are the three Fama-French 
risk factors and a bond factor. The Merrill Lynch U.S. Broad Market Index, which 
includes U.S. Treasury, quasi-government, corporate, securitized and collateralized 
securities, is used to proxy for the bond market in the EGB model. Since the index began 
at the end of 1975, this led to the restriction of our study period to thirty years (1976-
2006). 
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One lagged instrument is used for public information. The lagged stochastically 
detrended risk-free rate is defined as the return difference between the lagged 30-day 
U.S. Treasury bill and the lagged two-month moving average to decrease the persistence 
of the original yield (Dahlquist and Söderlind, 1999). 
2.5.  RESULTS 
The primary objective of the GMM estimation is to test whether the suggested 
SDF specification prices all primitive assets and the mutual fund(s) under consideration 
so that we can better distinguish between model failure and market inefficiency. 
 
2.5.1 Model Performance Based on HJ Distances (First Ranking Criterion) 
We first compare the SDF candidate models using the Hansen-Jagannathan (HJ) 
(1997) distance D (first ranking criterion), which equals the square root of the quadratic 
function used in the standard GMM estimation when the parameters used are one-step 
estimators and the weighting matrix is the inverse of the second moment of the primitive 
asset returns to down-weight noise generated by the moment conditions.
 12
 Or: 
















 tttttttt ZrmERREZrmED  
(15) 
This metric is interpreted as the distance between the sample SDF estimates and 
the space of real SDFs (i.e., the necessary correction to the proxy SDF in order to make it 
consistent with the data). Thus, the model with the lowest Hansen-Jagannathan distance 
D is considered to best price the investment opportunity set.  
                                                 
12
 The weighting matrix is invariant across all models tested, so the distance measure can be used to 
directly compare the performance of the different candidate models, rank different pricing theories and 
identify the ones that best reflect the value of money and SDF movements. 
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 For both settings (see figure 1),
13
 we find that the three highest ranked of the nine 
candidate models on this criterion in descending order of performance are the Carhart 
model, APT model and the Labor-Quadratic model, with the CAPM occupying the 
lowest rank for both settings. While the distances for five models improve with 
conditioning, the relative ranks are unchanged. 
[Please place figure 2.1 here.] 
2.5.2 Model Performance Based on HJ Boundary (Second Ranking 
Criterion)  
We now conduct Hansen and Jagannathan (HJ) (1991) volatility boundary tests to 
assess the relevance of each model. If a given SDF does not satisfy the restriction 
imposed on its lower-bound variability, then the SDF cannot satisfy the fundamental 
pricing equation and the related theoretical pricing model is not supported. We apply the 
following formula for this purpose: 
          
11 1Var m E m E R E m E R           (16) 
where m is the empirical SDF, R is the vector of gross returns for the ten primitive assets, 
and Σ is the estimate of their asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. 
The results from applying the second performance criterion suggested by Hansen 
and Jagannathan (1991) are depicted in Figure 2 for the equity funds reporting at least 
180 months of data (i.e. more than 15 years of business activity and subsequently referred 
to as 180-funds). This tool examines the behavior of the empirical stochastic discount 
factors depending on the model tested and the considered setting. Based on the 
percentage of the SDFs lying in the admissible region, we find that the three highest 
                                                 
13
 There are no substantial differences between the results related to the quadratic spectral window and 
those related to the Bartlett and Parzen ones. Consequently, we chose to report the outcomes of the 
optimization procedure related to the quadratic spectral kernel only. This type of window has been proven 
to lead to a faster convergence of the quadratic spectral density matrix estimator. 
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ranked models in descending order of performance are the Carhart, the FF and the Labor-
Cubic (the Labor-CAPM) models under the unconditional (conditional) setting. The APT 
is the poorest performer with only 2.95% of the SDFs lying in the admissible region for 
both settings. The percentages decrease marginally, with conditioning, from 87.95% to 
87.84% for the Carhart model, and dramatically from 83.07% to 64.77% for the FF 
model.  
[Please place figure 2.2 here.] 
2.5.3 Model Performance Based on Average Absolute Error (Third 
Ranking Criterion) 
These somewhat conflicting inferences from the measures of misspecification and 
membership in the mean-variance admissible region for the SDFs raise the issue of 
whether or not the models describing the pricing kernels are appropriate. To further 
explore this issue, we use a third ranking criterion, the average absolute pricing error 
(AAE). Based on the results reported in Figure 3 for the unconditional setting, we find 
that the three highest ranked of the nine candidate models on this criterion in descending 
order of performance are the CAPM, FF model and Carhart model, with the Cubic, 
Labor-Cubic and Labor-Quadratic models occupying the lowest ranks. The top three 
rankings change their order and become Carhart model, CAPM and FF model for the 
conditional setting. Thus, the AAE criterion suggests that the three models based on the 
first and second moments of risk factors perform better than the models that account for 
macroeconomic factors or the higher-order moments of the market risk factor.  
[Please place figure 2.3 here.] 
2.5.4 Model Performance Based on SDF Alphas (Fourth Ranking 
Criterion)  
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We now evaluate the empirical probability distributions of alphas for the funds 
with at least 180 data return observations for each model under both settings. Based on 
Figure 4, the fund performances are mostly negative except for the Cubic model. The 
cross-sectional distributions of alphas for the unconditional setting are right-skewed for 
the APT and Carhart models, left-skewed for the Cubic model and virtually symmetric 
for the other six models. In contrast, the cross-sectional distributions of alphas for the 
unconditional setting are right-skewed for the CAPM, Labor CAPM and Quadratic 
model, left-skewed for the Cubic and Labor-Cubic models, and reasonably symmetric for 
the other four models. The alpha distributions for the Carhart and FF models exhibit 
thicker right tails.  
[Please place figure 2.4 here.] 
An examination of the number of cases where the average alpha is statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level shows that the number of occurrences where the 
alphas are significantly different from zero range between 16 (0.11%) and 195 (1.30%) 
out of 14,996 equity funds (see Table 3). In addition, we find that the three highest 
ranked of the nine candidate models on this criterion in descending order of performance 
are the Carhart, the Labor-Quadratic (APT) and the Labor-Cubic (FF) under the 
unconditional (conditional) setting, with the Labor-CAPM and CAPM occupying the 
eight and ninth ranks for both settings. 
[Please place table 2.3 here.] 
2.6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
2.6.1 Portfolios of Funds  
Since the individual fund results may be affected by cross-sectional correlation in 
returns, we apply GMM optimization to two portfolios of funds.  
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 Based on the HJ distances (first ranking criterion) for both settings, the three 
highest ranked models in descending order of performance are the Carhart, the FF and the 
APT models for the equally-weighted portfolios (hereafter EW) and the size-weighted 
portfolios (hereafter SW) of all 180 funds, and the subsamples of surviving, alive and 
dead equity funds. The least performing model for both settings for this criterion, is the 
Labor-CAPM for SW portfolio of surviving funds and EW portfolio of dead funds and 
the CAPM for EW and SW portfolios of alive funds. 
For both settings, we find that the empirical SDF lies on the HJ boundary (second 
ranking criterion) only for the Carhart and FF models for the EW portfolios, and only for 
the Carhart model for the SW counterparts. The results of applying the HJ boundary test 
to the portfolios corroborates the superior appropriateness of the Carhart and FF models 
for the EW and SW portfolios of alive and dead funds for both settings, and the Carhart 
model for the EW and SW portfolios of surviving funds for both settings. The superiority 
of the Carhart over the FF model is greater for the alive and dead funds in a conditional 
setting. Hence, the Carhart model remains the most appropriate specification for the 
pricing kernel according to the HJ boundary test based on the portfolio results. 
Based on the AAE (third ranking criterion) for both settings, the three highest 
ranked models are the Carhart, the FF and the CAPM (Labor-Quadratic) models for EW 
(SW) portfolios and the APT is the lowest ranked model for all portfolios of funds. For 
the EW and SW portfolios of surviving, alive and dead equity funds, the two top models 
exchange their respective ranks in some instances. 
2.6.2 The EGB Model 
As a further test of the robustness, we use a four-index model as in Elton et 
al.(EGB) (1999) and Ayadi & Kryzanowski (2008), which replaces the momentum factor 
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in the Carhart model with a broad-based bond market index. The objective is to examine 
whether results change in terms of SDF volatility and abnormal performance compared to 
the rest of the tested candidates. Based on the first ranking criterion (HJ distances), the 
EGB model is ranked third after the Carhart and APT models for both settings. 
The percentages of cases where the SDF mean-standard deviation for this 
additional model is inside the HJ boundary (second ranking criterion) are 5.09% for both 
settings (see table 4). While the EGB model does not outrank the Carhart and FF model 
under the unconditional setting, the latter comes second behind the Carhart model under 
the conditional setting, it ranks behind the Carhart model with a percentage of 78.32% for 
the 180-funds in the conditional setting.  
[Please place table 2.4 here.] 
The ranking of the EGB based on the AAE (third ranking criterion) is sixth under 
the conditional setting and least under the conditional setting. The percentage of 
significant alphas (fourth ranking criterion) at the 5% level resulting from the EGB model 
is only 0.98% (147 funds) under the unconditional setting and even lower at 0.07% (11 
funds) under the conditional setting. The percentages rise to 16.96% and 1.27% for the 
unconditional and conditional settings, respectively, for the 180-funds. All significant 
alphas are negative regardless of the setting, and conditioning results in some of the 
significant alphas becoming insignificant. Thus, after conditioning for common 
knowledge, the resulting inference is that fund managers do not add even value to cover 
their costs.  
2.6.3 Alternative Investment Opportunity (IO) Set of Primitive Assets 
As a further test of robustness, we replace the ten value-weighted industry 
portfolios by the 125 size-, value- and momentum-sorted equity portfolios of Wermers 
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(2004). The objective for the use of an alternative set of primitive assets based on style-
based portfolios is to examine changes in the rankings of the candidate models and the 
alphas of the fund managers. Based on the HJ distances (first ranking criterion), we find 
that the three highest ranked models in descending order of performance are the CAPM, 
FF model and the Carhart model for both settings, with the Cubic-Labor (Cubic) 
occupying the lowest rank under the unconditional (conditional) setting. 
While the cubic (24.90%) and quadratic (22.84%) models yield more cases inside 
the cup based on the HJ boundary test (second ranking criterion) with these style-sorted 
benchmarks than with the former IO set, the differences between the proportions of 
permissible cases yielded by the different candidate models are not statistically 
significant. Based on the AAE measure (third ranking criterion), the FF and the CAPM 
are the top-ranked models, followed by the Labor-CAPM, with the APT model 
occupying the lowest rank for both settings. 
[Please place figure 2.6 about here] 
The percentages of significant alphas (fourth ranking criterion) are negligible and 
range between 1.09% (CAPM) and 2.19% (APT) of the whole sample, of which 33.97% 
(CAPM) and 49.68% (Quadratic-Labor) are positive, under the conditional setting. This 
result confirms the overall conclusion that any significant performance is not likely to be 
due to superior ability or the lack thereof.  
[Please place table 2.5 about here] 
The relaxation of the constraint that the SDF is positive (the no-arbitrage 
assumption) shows that the volatility of the SDF is substantially higher, as found in 
Fletcher (2010). This constraint has a significant effect on the variation of the pricing 
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kernel over time for all nine models, with the cubic and quadratic candidates becoming 
top ranked (with 80.51% and 81.03% of cases inside the cup, respectively).  The Carhart 
model followed by the Labor-Cubic model exhibits the statistically lowest cross-sectional 
average AAE, with the Quadratic model occupying the lowest rank. Based on the HJ 
distances, the Carhart and APT models are the top-ranked models, with the Labor-Cubic 
(Labor-Quadratic) model yielding the highest HJ distances under the unconditional 
(conditional) setting. 
2.7. CONCLUSION 
This paper finds that the stochastic discount factor (SDF) approach is consistent 
with the market efficiency hypothesis. Expected mutual fund returns are unpredictable 
and money managers do not demonstrate superior ability to time the market and exploit 
mispricings and misperceptions. It is statistically not feasible to extend short-run 
abnormal performance over the long-run since US equity mutual funds are zero-alpha 
performers. 
With regard to the different SDF specifications, we find that the Carhart model 
(followed by the FF model) is the best suited for assessing the performance of the mutual 
fund dataset examined herein. Use of the Carhart model results in the smallest average 
pricing errors and produces the largest number of cases in the admissible region of SDF 
mean-variance with the ten value-weighted industry portfolios as the investment 
opportunity set. The relative performance of each model is sensitive to the choice of the 
portfolios forming the investment opportunity set.  The Carhart model continues to be 
highly ranked when the investment opportunity set is based on style-sorted portfolios, but 
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the non-linear specifications improve their ranks especially with the second and third 
criteria; namely, the HJ boundaries and the AAE. 
As predicted, conditioning information has an effect on the results. Conditioning 
lowers the number of funds with significant alphas. Our results raise several follow-up 
questions. First, should different instrumental variables be used in the pricing equations 
for equity funds? Second, is the lagged detrended riskfree rate an adequate indicator of 




US MUTUAL FUND M&As 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Business combinations represent an efficient avenue for growth. If the bid price is 
fair, mergers can allow for synergies in the employed physical and human capital and 
may lead to abnormal performances that are not obtainable with separate entities. The 
visibility of the newly created business, the range of products offered, the quality of the 
service, the targeted market, the geographic diversification, and the expertise of the new 
management team are all arguments in favour of merger activity.
14
 This stylized fact is 
supported in the literature for firms in, for example, manufacturing and services (e.g., 
Asquith et al., 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Andrade et al., 2001).  
As Jayaraman et al. (2002) argue the exponential growth in the mutual fund 
industry has led to consolidation in the financial services industry since the early 2000s. 
Jayaraman et al. (2002) find that target funds are significantly smaller in asset size, incur 
higher expense ratios, and perform poorly compared to acquiring funds over the four-year 
study period (1994-1997). The target (acquiring) fund’s performance improves 
(deteriorates) in the first year post-merger and the expense ratio for the combined fund is 
similar to that of the acquiring fund pre-merger. Perold and Salomon (1991) link the 
higher size of assets under management (AUM) after merger to greater scale economies 
resulting from decreased fixed operating costs. As one of their measures of agency costs, 
Ferris and Yan (2009) report that public fund families engage in a significantly larger 
                                                 
14
 We use the terms ‘merger’ and ‘M&As’ (mergers and acquisitions) interchangeable throughout this 
paper. 
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number of acquisitions undifferentiated by the type of acquired fund than private fund 
families over the period of 1993-2004. However, their study differs from ours in that 
Ferris and Yan do not conduct an event-like study of the performance of either the 
acquiring or the acquired funds. 
The objective of this paper is to extend the work of Jayaraman et al. (2002) by 
examining the pre-merger conditions of each M&A participant separately and the post-
M&A impact of the merger on the acquiring funds for 6,680 M&As over the period 
1962-2009. To this end, we examine the effects of M&As and termination activities in 
terms of costs, reputation, efficiency and risk in the mutual fund industry to test whether 
wealth transfer persists over a 48-year test period. As the most important concern for 
unitholders is the risk-return tradeoff, we test if fund performance improves when 
unitholders of the target fund become acquiring fund unitholders, and the extent to which 
risk changes post-M&A. Since a target unitholder needs to decide whether to maintain his 
or her position or to liquidate it, we identify the determinants of M&A success, extending 
the work of Jayaraman et al. (2002) where the determinants of the occurrence of M&As 
are studied. Potential determinants examined include the sizes, performances, asset flows, 
expense ratios and investment objectives of the M&A participants. Thus, our findings 
provide some initial guidance in whether a target unitholder should exit or remain with 
the surviving fund post-M&A. It also provides some guidance to sponsors who wish to 
increase AUM though external growth. 
We estimate the conditional abnormal performance of target and acquiring funds 
using the four-factor Carhart (1997) model. To obtain efficient estimates, we use 
Hansen’s (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) and an estimator of the spectral 
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density matrix as the weighting matrix. Consistent with the literature, we find that, while 
the unitholders of targets benefit more than their counterparts in the acquiring funds 
unitholders from M&As, the performance improvement is small. Cost efficiency and 
superior management ability through M&As are more pronounced over shorter and more 
recent periods than over the full 48-year period. The semi-variance of monthly returns for 
acquirers changes post-M&A. Explanatory variables considered in a logistic regression to 
determine the significant forces driving successful M&As include: the ages of the target 
and acquiring funds at transaction dates to proxy for their reputations, the sizes of the 
bidder and the target fund, the past performance of the target fund, the average MER of 
the bidder and the target, the average net asset flow for the target prior to the M&A, 
dummy bull/bear market indicators to proxy for the timing of the deal, the Investment 
Style (hereafter IS) of the target and merger type (within vs. across-IS and within vs. 
across-family).  
The paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it finds that the 
abnormal performance improvement around the M&As primarily benefits target 
unitholders, but that the increase in risk post-M&A is incompatible with a significantly 
higher abnormal performance. Fund risk increases post-M&A for the unitholders of 
acquirers and is unchanged for unitholders of targets. The latter finding is consistent with 
the continuity or smooth transition hypothesis. The mean-variance efficiency of high-risk 
bidder funds deteriorates while that of low-risk bidder funds remains unchanged. Thus, 
M&As only affect unitholders of high-risk bidder funds adversely. The window of 
opportunity and smooth transition hypotheses are supported since the target’s reputation 
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(as proxied by its age), target’s size and timing of the deal are significantly related to 
prospective post-M&A outperformance.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the studied sample. 
Section 4 reports and analyzes abnormal performance and risk around the M&As. Section 
5 presents the specification of the logistic regressions to examine the determinants of 
successful fund M&As and analyzes the empirical results. Section six provides 
concluding remarks. 
3.2. TESTED HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1. Window of Opportunity 
Sapp and Tiwari (2004) show that the smart money effect documented by Gruber 
(1996) and Zheng (1999) is explained by the stock return momentum phenomenon. This 
provides the underpinning for the window of opportunity hypothesis. If investors chase 
past winners and targets are primarily past losers and the fund M&As occur during 
bullish times, then they provide opportunities for the acquirer fund to enlarge their AUM 
(including the attraction of new money). 
3.2.2. Smooth Transition 
Pollet and Wilson (2008) find that fund managers increase their ownership 
interest as the fund grows, rather than focusing on new bets, except to accommodate 
liquidity constraints. Thus, if two entities of the same type enter into an M&A, the newly 
incumbent managers are more likely to continue with their same investment strategies.  
We would expect that the bidder’s strategy would prevail post-M&A if the 
motivation driving the fund M&A is: (i) the target’s past poor performance, or (ii) is 
predicated on a strategic move across family. If consummated successfully, both types of 
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motivated M&As should have a positive impact on the wealth of unitholders but with 
unitholders of the target (bidder) benefiting most from the first (second) motivation.  
The smooth transition hypothesis emanates from the premise that mutual fund 
sponsors need to ensure that changes to increase returns with unchanged risk are noticed 
by existing unitholders (particularly, those that remained in the fund regardless of its past 
performance). Whether the M&A is within- or across-family, any changes in investment 
strategy need to be gradual, fully disclosed and explained to the unitholders in order to 
keep current AUM and to attract new fund inflows. The smooth transition hypothesis is 
tested by examining risk levels, MERs and the types of assets held for target and bidder 
funds around fund M&A.  
3.2.3. Diseconomies of Scale 
The literature finds that smaller funds tend to outperform larger funds due to 
diseconomies of scale (Chen et al., 2004). We hypothesize that M&A success increases if 
the bidder is smaller. We subsequently test this hypothesis using a logistic regression 
analysis. 
3.2.4. Fund Flow Effect  
Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000) demonstrate that shareholder flows negatively 
affect after-tax returns of mutual funds. Hence, we expect that the average fund flow into 
target mutual funds during the one year pre-M&A will be negatively related to the 
subsequent probability of success of the M&A. This hypothesis is related to the 
hypothesis that the probability of M&A success and positive abnormal risk-adjusted 
returns are positively related to poorer performance of the target fund. 
3.3. SAMPLE, DATA AND SOME DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.3.1. Data Collection 
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From the CRSP survivorship-bias-free mutual fund database for the period 
January 1962 to May 2009, we extract 8,410 mutual funds with “merger” as the delisting 
cause (i.e. M or M? codes) that also report the identifier of the new entity. The sample is 
reduced to 7,151 mergers after excluding those funds with missing monthly returns or 
monthly returns reported on an irregular basis.  
The resulting sample is matched with investment style data using multiple sources 
of information. Wiesenberger Policy codes are the primary source prior to 1993 and 
Strategic Investment thereafter until December 1999. Lipper objective code data are used 
from December 1999. Thomson-Reuters group codes are used to check the coherence of 
information from the different sources for data from 2008. We manually assign 
investment objectives to 65 M&As based on the asset classes held by the missing-style 
funds or their headers, and are unable to assign an investment objective to 96 M&As. 
Hence, our sample of M&As with style information consists of 7,055 combinations of 
target and acquiring funds with regular monthly returns and fund style information 
reported over their business life. Our information-coherence checks result in the 
exclusion of 375 M&As where the necessary monthly returns before the delisting date of 
the target fund are missing.  
3.3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics on the monthly returns of the samples of target and acquiring 
funds are reported in table 1 for the final sample of 6,680 M&As.
15
 The number of 
acquiring funds of 4,459 is lower than the number of successfully targeted funds of 6,680 
due to several instances where more than one targeted mutual fund is merged into the 
                                                 
15
 The sample of 7,151 M&As contains 387 M&As where the delisting dates of target funds either do not 
coincide with the inception dates of merged funds or do not belong to the regularly-reported monthly 
returns time interval of the surviving funds. Hence, ignoring the investment style information makes the 
size of the raw sample equal to 6,764 cases. 
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same surviving fund. Specifically, we identify 912 cases with one acquired target, 283 
cases with two acquired targets, 86 cases with three acquired targets, 41 cases with four 
acquired targets, and finally one case with 13 acquired targets (see table 2). Also, 1,206 
funds change from being the acquirer to being the acquired over the study period.  
[Please place tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here.] 
As reported in table 2, the M&A participants have different investment styles for 
225 of the M&As. Equity target funds exhibit the greatest number of changes (95 cases) 
with 77 of them acquired by hybrid funds, ten by bond funds, seven by convertibles funds 
and one by a money market fund. The targeted bond funds have only 32 cases of 
investment style changes, 12 to equity, 11 to hybrid, eight to money market and one to 
convertibles funds. Only two and five of the target money market funds became equity 
and bond funds, respectively. Sixty-five, three and one target hybrid funds became 
equity, bond and convertibles funds, respectively. Eleven, three and eight target 
convertible funds became equity, bond and hybrid funds, respectively. 
The absence of Total Net Assets (TNA) information used to investigate average 
transaction sizes results in the elimination of 2,059 M&As, involving 4,621 targets and 
3,256 acquiring funds. Over the study period for every year, we calculate the 2.5%, 25%, 
75%, 97.5% TNA percentiles, and the time-series average of each series of percentiles for 
the sample of acquired (and acquiring) funds. Table 3 reports the average number of 
funds involved in annual M&As, the two extreme percentiles and the median, for the total 
sample and the five subsamples based on investment style over the whole period 1962-
2009 and for the four subperiods (1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2009) with 
non-zero percentages. 
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The 97.5% percentile of target fund sizes is on average one-the fifth of the size of 
the corresponding merged funds (306.67 vs. 1,646.86 million USD). Mutual fund assets 
acquired in the last decade have increased and represent on average seven times their 
homologs in the 1970s (311.22 vs. 42.63 million USD). On average, 159 targets are 
involved each year in a M&A over the total study period. The annual number is 400 
M&As over the most recent period 2001-2009. Merger fund activity (not) differentiated 
by investment style is more important in number during the last decade compared to the 
distant past. The average equity fund target at the 97.5% percentile of size of 181.04 
million USD is lower than that of all other categories of funds except convertibles ones. 
With regard to merged funds, money market funds register the highest average 97.5% 
percentile of TNA over the whole period. During the most recent decade, equity funds are 
ranked second with an average of 2,700.90 million USD. 
[Please place table 3.3 about here.] 
The management expense ratio (MER) is defined as the ratio of total investment 
that shareholders pay for the fund’s operating expenses which include the 12b-1 fees. The 
MER of a mutual fund may change over time either because of a changing level of 
operating efficiency or due to competitive forces. Table 4 reports the cross-sectional 
statistics of time-series averages of MERs for the 6,464 fund M&As (6,464 targets and 
4,307 merged entities) with MER information. On average, the expenses incurred by 
target fund unitholders exceed those of their merged fund counterparts (1.45% vs. 1.34%) 
for the whole sample and for all but the money market and convertible funds subsamples. 
This suggests that higher operating costs may be a trigger for some of the mergers. The 
maximum MERs and kurtosis are substantially larger for target funds (7.51% and 4.09%) 
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than for merged funds (3.82% and 2.50%). With more extreme data points, target mutual 
funds are a less homogeneous group compared to the resulting merging funds.  
[Please place table 3.4 about here.] 
Monthly income distributions are one of the selection criteria used by investors 
seeking short-term income on a regular basis. We obtain 2,037 usable cases with such 
data and 941 cases (941 targets and 638 merged funds) that also have investment style 
information. We transform dollar amounts into percentages for each month-end date and 
every fund, and aggregate all types of income distributions to obtain a single monthly 
income distribution rate for each fund. Based on table 5, the 858 bond funds have an 
average rate of income distribution of 0.47% for target funds and 0.45% for merged 
funds. The average life of included funds is nine years for targets and five years for 
merged funds, and is largest for money market funds. Tests of whether monthly income 
distributors represent a suitable candidate for a successful merger are inconclusive. Since 
the end-of-fiscal-year distributions tend to be higher than those for the rest of the year 
due to the multiple types of income payments, the rates are consequently higher which 
adds outliers to each time-series of fund distributions and results in kurtosis being 
substantially higher than the normal three-level. Furthermore, fat tails are more 
pronounced for target than for merged funds and for hybrid funds.  
[Please place table 3.5 about here.] 
Based on the monthly numbers and volumes of M&As that satisfy our inclusion 
criteria, the maximum monthly volume of in-sample M&As in the 1970s of 157 million 




 Over the remaining months of both decades, number of M&As and their volumes 
are small (between zero and 108 million USD). In contrast for the 1990s and 2000s, 
maximum monthly M&A volume of 3,518.18 and 7,499.60 million USD occurred in 
October 1994 and August 2005, respectively. The annual number of M&As is very low at 
the beginning of the studied period and starts to increase after 1987 (i.e., the year of the 
so-called “Market Crash of 1987”), and declines dramatically around 1999 (i.e., near the 
end of the tech bubble). The peak in numbers is reached in 2007 with 775 cases. Relative 
to active funds, on average, only 1% of the mutual funds cease operations annually due to 
a M&A. In the 2000s, M&As occur more often since they exceed 2% of active funds for 
90% of the time. The percentages are rarely higher than two percent in the 1990s, but are 
larger than 1% for 90% of the time. Also, the annual volume distribution is similar to that 
of the absolute number of mergers. As the number of funds increases over time, so does 
the relative size of the merged funds. The average relative size peaks at 1.06% in 1980, 
and stabilizes at a level of 0.17% in the 1990s and 2000s.  
Finally, we examine whether the monthly M&A activity is seasonal.  Based on 
the sample autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of first-order differences in 
logarithmic number of changes, mutual fund M&As are generated by an autoregressive 
process. This could be an indication of merger waves. The monthly merger quartiles and 
maxima over the whole period show that the month of May has the highest number of 
M&As, followed by February and October. The subperiods spanning the period 1981 to 
2009 reveal a similar pattern with a predominance of M&As in July and December for 
the first decade. 
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 All volume and size analyses involve only the 4,621 usable cases for which returns, investment style and 
TNA information are available.  
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3.4. ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE AND RISK 
3.4.1 Methodology 
The gains from M&A activity are examined first by testing the significance of any 
abnormal performance shift from the pre- to post-M&A periods for both target and 
acquirer funds. Given the evidence of performance persistence in the mutual fund 
industry (Christopherson et al., 1998, Fletcher and Forbes, 2002), performance is 
estimated using the general asset pricing model with the four-factor Carhart linear model 
specification for the stochastic discount factor. The investment opportunity set is 
represented by ten value-weighted industry portfolios (as in Fletcher and Forbes, 2004).
17
 
The number of moment conditions becomes 12 with the inclusion of the monthly return 
on the risk-free security 
1ftR   and the subject mutual fund conditions.
18
 The addition of 
the risk-free security ensures that the SDF takes sensible values (around one) and sums to 
the numéraire or reference security condition. The addition of the subject mutual fund 
conditions allows for a test of whether the subject fund is part of the optimal investment 
opportunity set (abnormal performance is neutral), improves it (abnormal performance is 
significantly positive) or contains a suboptimal array of securities (abnormal performance 
is significantly negative).  




                                                 
17
 Industries included are Non Durables, Durables, Manufacturing, Energy, HiTech, Telecom, Shops, 
Health, Utilities and other, whose data are obtained from the Kenneth French Library. 
18
 We refer to moment conditions as orthogonality conditions and average pricing errors interchangeably, 
and stochastic discount factor and pricing kernel interchangeably. 
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where  is the pricing kernel prevailing from time t to time t+1; is the excess 
monthly return of the subject mutual fund over the risk-free rate; and is the measure 
of abnormal performance attributed to the fund manager. The market timing effect on 
performance is isolated by estimating conditional performance (Ferson and Schadt, 1996) 
using the lagged stochastically detrended risk-free rate as the instrumental variable to 
reflect macroeconomic conditions (Cochrane, 2001). 
Unlike a merger announcement for two corporate participants in efficient markets, 
such an announcement does not have an “immediate” effect on performance for fund 
M&As.
19
 Thus, the event-study method is modified to examine the average abnormal 
performance of targets and acquiring funds (pre- and post-M&A) over much longer pre- 
and post-event windows. After testing for the normality of the SDF return distributions, 
we conduct paired tests of the estimated alphas in pre- and post-periods for the full 
sample and five fund categories over the full time period and each of the five decades 
enclosed therein. 
3.4.2 Abnormal Performance 
3.4.2.1 Average performances over fund lifetimes 
The median SDF alpha of the target funds is 0.06% whereas the median abnormal 
performance of the acquiring fund is 0.13% pre-M&A and 0.02% post-M&A. The paired 
tests, which are reported in table 6, show that, on average, differences in SDF alphas are 
statistically significant. The sample standard deviations of SDF alphas are comparable for 
both entities (between 0.90% and 1.00%). Nevertheless, the negative skewness of the 
SDF alphas for target and pre-M&A acquiring funds, coupled with substantial kurtosis 
                                                 
19
 See appendix B for more details about the mechanics of a US mutual funds merger, as dictated by the 
Investment Company Act 1940. 
 43 
levels, show a tendency for extreme and negative abnormal performance pre- versus post-
M&A. The acquiring funds yield the highest percentages of positive (0.01%) and 
negative (0.52%) significant SDF alphas prior to the M&As. The difference in the 
percentage of significant SDF alphas between target and post-M&A bidders (p-
value=0.02) and between post- and pre-M&A bidders (p-value<0.01) is significant. The 
primary conclusion from the overall sample is that the abnormal performance distribution 
for the acquiring funds change upon M&A. The thinner left tails post M&A could result 
from economies of scale due to larger AUM or from the strategic changes made to offer 
the most suitable product to existing unitholders of both entities.  
[Please place table 3.6 about here.] 
When examined by decade (see Table 6), the median SDF alpha of targets equals 
0.05% (-0.22%) and of acquirers equals 0.37% (0.15%) pre-M&A and -0.03% (0.06%) 
post-M&A during the 1960s (1970s). In the two first decades of the study, differences in 
SDF alphas are not significant between targets and post-M&A bidders and between pre- 
and post-M&A bidders. In the 1980s, the median SDF alpha of the acquiring funds equals 
0.09% pre-M&A and 0.07% thereafter, but the percentage of significant SDF alphas for 
post-M&A bidders equals 9.63% (3.61% positive and 6.02% negative) whereas that of 
the pre-M&A bidders reaches 1.23%, all positive. Acquiring funds tend to yield more 
negative abnormal performance post- M&A confirming the performance deterioration 
(significant at 0.01 level) around M&As revealed by the medians. Consequently, the 
integration experiences are not as seamless as they should have been through the M&A 
process. The 1990s show the same pattern as the 1980s for median SDF alphas, but the 
SDF alphas of targets and pre-M&A bidders are on average statistically higher than those 
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for acquirers. This indicates a time-dependent discontinuity in performance for the pre-
M&A unitholders of the acquirers after the M&As. 
The 2000s are characterized by the neutrality of the performance of acquiring 
funds post-M&A given no abnormal SDF alphas compared to low but positive 
percentages pre-M&A. Results show that negative and significant SDF alphas are 
neutralized post-M&A (from 1.83% to 0.00%) and that targets also benefit from the same 
phenomenon with their SDF alphas moving from 1.76% to 0.00%. The changes are 
statistically significant at 0.01 level. However, the median SDF alphas tell a different 
story. The median SDF alphas of acquirers move significantly from 0.12% to 0.01% post-
M&A, and those for targets are significantly higher at 0.05%. 
Bond (money market) funds exhibit significant performance improvement post-
M&A, with a median SDF alpha of 0.06% (-0.05%) for targets, 0.09% (-0.02%) for 
acquiring funds pre-M&A and 0.10% (-0.01%) post-M&A.  The empirical SDF alphas 
exhibit positive skewness and high kurtosis pointing to the likelihood of extreme values 
and the preponderance of high abnormal performances. The money market targets have a 
tendency to underperform with 7.14% of them having significant negative SDF alphas. In 
contrast, only 0.15% of bond target funds exhibit significantly negative SDF alphas. This 
changes post-M&A since the percentage for these two fund types falls significantly to 
respectively 1.90% (0.01 level) and 0.00% (0.10 level). The same gain is experienced by 
acquiring funds for pre-existing money market but not bond unitholders (0.10 level for 
the former). Finally, pre-M&A acquiring fund median SDF alphas are higher (and of a 
different sign) than those post-M&A for equity (0.32% vs. -0.06%), hybrid (0.30% vs. -
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0.15%) and convertibles (0.15% vs. -0.15%) funds. The shifts are statistically significant 
for all but the convertibles funds.  
3.4.2.2 Average performances over shorter time periods 
The 1-year SDF alphas are the result of a risk-adjusted return optimization based 
on only one year of data. The objective is to examine whether the effects of synergies, the 
benefits of a smooth transition and of economies of scale, if any, are captured by the 
abnormal performance metrics over the short-, mid- and long-term. Table 7 reports 
results for targets and acquiring funds (pre- and post-M&A). The bottom target fund 
posts a -4.92% SDF alpha over one year prior to M&A, and only -2.18% over 10 years. 
The opposite outcome occurs for the top fund with an SDF alpha of 5.65% over one year 
and 2.78% over ten years. For bidders post-M&A, the bottom fund yields -5.09% 
abnormal performance after one year and -1.08% after 10 years; both are not significantly 
different from the bottom bidder fund pre-M&A.  
[Please place table 3.7 about here.] 
Median SDF alphas over the short- and longer run for the sample of target funds 
are all negative and significantly lower than their corresponding values for post-M&A 
bidders (see table 8). Through the decades, only the 2000s yield significant differences 
between SDF alphas around M&As (medians of -0.10% to -0.04%, respectively). M&As 
in the 1990s do not experience a substantial change in short-term performance as changes 
appear to take from 3 to 7 years post-M&A.  
Within-family M&As yield palpable changes by the first year as median SDF 
alphas move from -0.09% to -0.03%, and for all terms except ten years (because of 
missing information about the type of some cases). Across-family mergers take more 
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time to deliver significant performance improvement; namely two years, where the 
median moves from -0.18% to -0.01%. Like within-family mergers, this result is obtained 
for the rest of the post-M&A time periods. 
The sample subdivided by deal size shows no important changes in the short-run 
in both tails. This result changes after two years for the top 30% (at 0.01 level) and the 
top 10% (at 0.10 level). For the rest of the post-M&A time periods, performance 
improvement occurs for both tails of the distribution of deal sizes, except for the ten-year 
term. 
An examination of the SDF alphas by asset class types shows that the first gainers 
from M&A synergies are the equity and money markets funds, where median SDF alphas 
increase from -0.21% and -0.07% to -0.13% and -0.01%, respectively. In the second year 
post-M&A, the hybrid funds experience a performance improvement at the 0.05 level, 
bond funds join the list in the third through tenth year post-M&A.  
[Please place table 3.8 about here.] 
3.4.3 Risk of the M&A Participants 
Overall, the risk of targets (0.12%) is significantly lower than that of acquirers 
(0.21%), and the risk of bidders (0.10%) is significantly lower pre- versus post-M&A, 
especially in the 1990s and 2000s, at the 0.01 level. The median risk of target equity 
funds equals 0.28%, and is significantly lower than that for bidders (0.43%) at the 0.01 
level. This characteristic is shared by all other asset class categories of funds with the 
exception of the money market funds where targets are significantly riskier than their 
acquirers at the 0.01 level. Also, all bidder asset class categories (except for fixed 
income) are significantly less risky pre- versus post-M&A, especially in the 1990s and 
2000s, at the 0.01 level. .  
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[Please place table 3.9 about here.] 
3.4.4 Risk-Return Trade-off  
Multiple comparisons of SDF alphas resulting from ANOVA analyses (Hochberg 
and Tamhane, 1987) confirm that the average target underperforms their acquirers pre- 
and post-M&A at the 0.05 level. On average, pre-M&A bidders are significantly less 
risky than their targets and post-M&A, and target risk does not increase post-M&A.  
The probability distribution of a Sharpe-like ratio (the ratio of SDF alpha to the 
square root of semi-variance) is depicted in Figure 1. The distribution of this Sharpe-like 
ratio for target funds is slightly right-skewed. The distribution of Sharpe-like ratios for 
acquirers pre-M&A has a similar dispersion and thicker tails than that for the target 
funds. The right-skewness is more visible and reflects a higher likelihood of better returns 
for a unit of risk borne by bidder unitholders prior to M&As. The distribution of Sharpe-
like ratios of post-M&A acquirers exhibit leptokurtic left skewness. In contrast, the 
distributions of Sharpe-like ratios over post-M&A periods ranging from one year to ten 
years differ. The right tails of the distributions for post-M&A bidders are virtually always 
thicker than their counterparts for pre-M&A bidders and targets and all modes are 
negative.  
[Please place figures 3.1 & 3.2 about here.] 
The frontiers of the portfolios in the mean-variance domain exhibit variations in 
the second-order stochastic dominance rankings according to the levels of risk, as proxied 
by the square root of the semi-variance. Based on Figure 3, the M&A is the most 
beneficial to all unitholders at very low levels of riskiness since the post-M&A bidder 
offers the highest SDF alphas and the target offers the lowest. The target is still better off 
being acquired to maximize the benefits for its unitholders at intermediary levels of risk, 
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although the portfolio acquirers at this risk level is less efficient post- versus pre-M&A. 
At high levels of risk, the M&As lead to a suboptimal frontier where the target funds pre-
M&A dominate the acquiring funds post-M&A. Thus, the success of mutual fund M&As 
appears to depend on the level of risk of both targets and acquirers. Those with low levels 
of risk could be promising candidates for a potential improvement in portfolio mean-
variance efficiency via M&As. To further test the robustness of these findings, we 
examine the first-order stochastic dominance of portfolios of acquirers and targets over 
different levels of risks for the cases posting significant SDF alphas. 
[Please place figure 3.3 about here.] 
Figure 4 depicts the cumulative distribution functions of significant SDF alphas 
for six categories of risk: bottom 10%, bottom 25%, bottom 50%, top 50%, top 25% and 
top 10%. We find that for low levels of risk, there are no significant differences between 
the different entities. For the top levels of risk, the pre-M&A bidders have the most 
dominant portfolios, although the differences between the post-M&A bidders and targets 
are not striking. Thus, for more risky mutual funds, the targets posting significant alphas 
do not experience an important change (whether positive or negative) in the mean-
variance efficiency of their portfolios. In contrast, the bidders do lose and the pre-M&A 
unitholders are better off divesting before the M&A finalizes. For less risky funds, it is 
unclear whether there is a considerable improvement or deterioration in the mean-
variance efficiency of the portfolios. 
[Please place figure 3.4 about here.] 
3.5.  DETERMINANTS OF M&A SUCCESS 
3.5.1 Methodology 
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In this section, we test possible determinants of a successful mutual fund M&A by 
conducting a logistic regression where the dependent variable M&A Successi is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the average objective-adjusted return is strictly 
positive and zero otherwise for participant i.
20
  This mimics an investor whose goal is to 
choose a better performing fund from among an array of mutual funds that match his 
liquidity needs, investment horizon and risk tolerance, as proxied by a set of products 
offering the same investment style. The objective-adjusted monthly return is obtained as 
the raw return of the subject fund for month t minus the mean monthly return of all active 
funds offering the same investment style for month t.  
We consider a number of potential determinants of M&A success. We include the 
age of both the target TiAge  and the acquirer PiAge  in years measured at the deal 
completion date of merger i. Fund age is used as a proxy for reputation as it indicates 
whether the incumbent investment advisor has been able to attract or retain assets under 
management (AUM). The asset sizes of the acquirer and the target at the deal date, SizeB 
and SizeT, are included to capture the ability of managers and advisors for the acquirer 
and target funds to satisfy existing investors and to appeal to prospective investors. The 
average net asset flow of the target prior to the deal date, TiFlow , is included to reflect the 
(in) ability of target funds to sustain or grow the asset base without the M&A (Del 
Guercio and Tkac, 2002; Jayaraman, 2002).  
The past performance of the target fund, TiAlpha , is included based on its 
expected negative relationship with the odds of M&A success. If the target is acquired 
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 The Newton-Raphson optimization method is used to implement the iterative process of parameter 
estimation. A heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix of the residuals is also used. See Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) for more details. 
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because of relatively poor past performance, the probability of better performance post- 
M&A should be higher. This variable is measured over different time periods ranging 
from one to ten years pre-M&A and over the whole lifetime if it exceeds ten years. We 
include the following three risk measures: σP or the pre-M&A risk of the bidder; σT or the 
target risk; and σB or the post-M&A risk of the bidder where σ is the square root of the 
semi-variance to capture downside risk. 
The average expense ratios of acquiring and target funds, MERB and MERT, are 
included with expected negative and positive signs respectively since they capture the 
operational efficiency of acquiring funds relative to target funds. The dummy variable, 
iFamily , which is equal to 1 for a within-family fund and to 0 otherwise, is included to 
test whether within-family M&As are the reflection of a desire to eliminate weak, 
redundant and unappealing funds, or across-family M&As which may be a response to a 
lack of diversity in the products offered by the acquiring fund family. The categorical 
variable, TiIS , stands for the investment style of the target fund for M&A i. The 
categorical variable, iDelta , is a dummy variable equal to 1 for an across-IS M&A and to 
0 otherwise, and is included to capture the effects of the different risk tolerances of 
unitholders by opting for one or the other of the categories of mutual funds.  
The dummy variable reflecting market conditions, Marketi , is equal to one for the 
bull market state at the time of the deal conclusion and to zero otherwise.
21
 This indicator 
is included to examine if funds exploit windows of opportunity by completing M&As 
based on early year tournament performance and during bull versus bear markets.  
The model to be estimated for merger i = 1..N is as follows:  
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Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics of the non-categorical independent 
variables.
22
 The number of observations varies from 6,680 to 4,621 because of the 
missing information about the characteristics of M&A participants and deal features.  The 
median age of targets in the whole sample is about six years at the transaction date 
whereas the mean age of bidders at the same date is about seven years. The prior average 
fund flows of targets are on average negative with a minimum of -$237.07 million over 
the year preceding the M&A. The average MER for bidders (1.31%) is lower than that of 
targets (1.45%). The average bidder’s downside risk equals 4.68 post-M&A versus 
3.48% pre-M&A. The average size of a bidder is about nine times the average size of a 
target.  
[Please place table 3.10 about here.] 
In order to include coherent measures of risk and performance for all entities we 
use the same length of time for estimates of semi-variances and for the indicators of 
positive/negative/neutral performances of the targets and the bidders.  We examine the 
explanatory power of the above-mentioned features of the deal, the bidders and the 
targets pre- and post-M&A, for different time periods of 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 years. The results 
are reported and analyzed in the next section. 
3.5.2 Empirical Findings 
The logistic regression results for merger success likelihood are summarized in 
Table 11. For the 95 cases with the necessary data over the 7-years post-M&A, M&A 
                                                 
22
 Correlation matrix of independent variables is available upon request.  
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success is positively related to target past performance (0.05 level) and prior fund flow   
(0.10 level). This does not support the expectation that negative net flows experienced by 
targets pre-M&A would be an indicator of post-M&A acquirer success over the long run. 
Also, prior seven-year performance of targets is directly related to M&A success. The 
profitability of the targets pre-M&A has explanatory power for 7-year outperformance 
post-M&A. 
[Please place table 3.11 about here.] 
For the 320 cases with the necessary data over the 5-years post-M&A, M&A 
success is positively related to the target’s risk pre-M&A (0.05 level). For bond funds, 
M&A success is positively related to the bidder’s risk pre-M&A, and the bidder’s size, 
and negatively related to the bidder’s risk post-M&A and MER. In other words, the 
largest, least risky and least costly bidders should be the most successful in bond fund 
M&A activities for a horizon of five years. For equity funds, M&A success is negatively 
related to the bidder’s age at the deal date, the bidder’s risk pre-M&A, the target’s size 
and to the Family variable, and positively related to the target’s risk and the bidder’s size. 
Hence, the across-family M&As, and the smallest and riskiest equity funds (on average 
$31 million) are targets for the largest and least risky bidders that are more likely to result 
in M&A success when measured over the five years post-M&A.  
For the 986 cases with the necessary data over the 3-years post-M&A, M&A 
success is positively related to the target’s age at the deal date, its prior performance, the 
bidder’s risk pre-M&A and the bull/bear market indicator, and negatively related to the 
post-M&A bidder’s risk and the Family variable. For equity funds, the coefficient signs 
for the risk, prior performance, and Family variables and their respective statistical 
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significance are the same as for the whole sample. For bond funds, M&A success is 
negatively related to prior target fund flows and post-merger bidder’s risk and positively 
related to the bidder’s risk pre-M&A, bidder’s size and market state. For hybrid funds, 
risky bidders prior to the deal completion are more likely to have successful fund M&As 
when the deals occur during bullish markets. 
For the 2,504 cases with the necessary data over the 1-year post-M&A, results 
show that good performing, risky and costly targets result in higher probabilities of M&A 
success. Paradoxically, bidders need to be small, risky prior to the M&A and less costly 
to affect positively the probability of success. Contrary to the longer-term results, the 
within-family M&As occurring in bearish markets exhibit a higher likelihood of 
outperformance one year post-deal. For equity funds, the well-established, good 
performing and risky targets are a statistically significant determinant of M&A success 
when the M&A involves same-family entities. Also, on average, the bidder’s size in 
equity fund M&A successes is about $342 million whereas it is about $445 million for 
M&A failures. For bond funds, M&A success is positively related to the age of the 
bidder, the target’s prior performance, the bidder’s risk pre-M&A, and the target’s MER. 
The odds of outperformance for bond funds are negatively related to the bidder’s risk 
post-M&A, the bidder’s MER and the market state. 
For the 2929 cases with the necessary data over the entire lifetime of funds post-
M&A, M&A success is positively related to prior performance and the target’s MER, and 
negatively related to the target’s and bidder’s risk, and the bidder’s MER. The 
relationship of M&A success with these fund performance and risk metrics are relatively 
unchanged for most of the various post-M&A periods examined. The robustness of the 
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results for the various regressions are important because they include all cases whether 
they survived only a limited term or still existed seven or more years after the M&A.  
Considering the window of opportunity hypothesis, we find that the bull/bear 
market indicator is a significant force driving M&A success. Its effect is negative over 
the short-term (1-year post-M&A), and becomes positive over the longer run (2-, 3-years 
post-M&A). We conclude that the window of opportunity is a viable hypothesis if we 
concentrate on the mid-term performance of a fund. Nevertheless, the Family indicator is 
significant and positive one year post-M&A, and negative 3-years post-M&A. In order to 
further examine these disparities in regression outcomes for different periods post-M&A, 
we conduct robustness tests in the following section.  
3.6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
3.6.1 Subsample of M&As 
 As a robustness test for our analysis of the determinants of merger success, we 
focus on a subsample of M&A cases. We refer to the 7-year sample as the merger cases 
involving funds that survived, and reported monthly TNA and returns on a regular basis 
for 7 years or longer. The logistic regressions are implemented using only the 218 data 
points meeting the 7-year condition, with the definitions of the independent variables 
remaining unchanged. We start with the dependent variable as the objective-adjusted 
returns post-M&A, then we consider an alternative proxy for the odds of success. The 
alternative proxy is a dummy variable based on the SDF alpha, taking a value of one if 
the SDF alpha is statistically significant and positive, and zero otherwise. 
3.6.1.1 Objective-adjusted returns as the dependent variable 
 The target size remains irrelevant in the determination of the success of fund 
M&As. The positive relation between target performance prior to M&A and the odds of 
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M&A success over the 1-year and 7-year periods post-M&A is robust to the change of 
the sample. Similarly, the negative relationship between the bidder risk of the fund post-
M&A and the success of the deal is confirmed for the 1- and 3-year terms. The target’s 
MER remains a significant explanatory variable for M&A success after the first and 
second years of the deal. Also, the bull-bear market indicator (Family indicator) is 
positively related to post-M&A outperformance after three (one) years of the deal 
completion.  
[Please place table 3.12 about here.] 
 The target’s fund flow prior to the deal conclusion date is still positively related to 
the probability of success for the 7-year term. The attractiveness of the target prior to the 
M&A is significantly related to the outperformance of the acquirer over the longer run. 
This result contradicts the fund-flow effect hypothesis, but is consistent with the positive 
relationship between target’s prior performance and M&A success. 
3.6.1.2 The SDF alpha as the dependent variable 
 Regardless of the definition of the dependent variable, the age of the bidder 
remains irrelevant in the determination of the success of the M&As for terms of 1 to 7 
years post-M&A. Also, the signs of the relationships between the three measures of risk 
and the odds of M&A success are robust to this test of sample selection for the 1-year 
term. Specifically, the estimated coefficient is positive for the target’s risk and bidder’s 
pre-merger risk and negative for the bidder’s post-merger risk one year post-M&A. Also, 
there is a consistent positive relationship between the bull-bear market indicator three 
years post-M&A and the target’s prior performance two and three years post-M&A, and 
the success of the M&A.  
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[Please place table 3.13 about here.] 
3.6.2 Alternative pricing kernel specification for bond funds 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our performance results for bond 
funds using a 4-index bond model kernel specification as in, for example, Ayadi and 
Kryzanowski (2008).
23
 Based on untabulated results, we find a 1- and 3-year performance 
improvement for target bond fund shareholders. The 2-year (7-year) SDF alphas decline 
(increase) significantly for the target and the merging funds post-M&A.  The 4-factor 
model results corroborate those of the momentum model for the 3- and 7-year terms only. 
Deals completed in the 1980s involving bond funds yield significant performance 
decreases post-M&A for terms of 2- and 3-years (7-years) for target (merging) fund 
shareholders. In contrast, M&As in the 2000s yield a significant positive change in 
performance after three and five years post-M&A for the shareholders of both entities. 
The bottom deal-size decile shows a negative change 3 years after M&A for target 
shareholders, whereas the top deal-size decile shows a positive (negative) change for a 1- 
(2-) year term post-M&A for the target (merging) fund shareholders. 
Based on the SDF alphas obtained using the 4-index model, the success 
determinants regression shows that the market conditions indicator is a consistent 
explanatory variable for M&A success over all terms. The relationship is negative 
supporting the hypothesis that successful bond fund M&As occur in bear markets. The 
pre-M&A risk of the bidder is positively related to M&A success for 2-, 5- and 7-year 
periods following the M&A. Only the negative relationship between the bull-bear market 
indicator at the 2-year term and the odds of success is robust to the definition of the 
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 Other factor models have also been proposed to examine bond fund performance (.e.g., Chen, Ferson and 
Peters, 2009). 
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discount factor. For bond funds, the Family indicator only has significance in the shorter-
term. Its positive estimated coefficient infers that within-family M&As involving bond 
funds are more likely to be successful 1-year post-M&A.   
We run the logistic regression with alternative independent variables that are 
limited to the following M&A participant characteristics: age, risk, MER for both entities 
and prior performance for the target. The use of a four-index bond model and the 
momentum models yield positive relationships between the target risk and the post-M&A 
outperformance after 2 years of the deal (p-value= 0.06 and 0.00, respectively), and 
between target MER and success after 3 years of the deal (p-value= 0.10 and 0.04, 
respectively). The outcomes for both models show a negative relationship between prior 
performance at the 5- (p-value= 0.01 and 0.00, respectively) and 7-year (p-value= 0.01 
and 0.03, respectively) terms and the odds of M&A success. 
3.6.3 Alternative pricing kernel specification for money market funds  
In this section, we examine the robustness of our performance results for money 
market funds using a 1-factor (Treasury bill rate of return) kernel specification. Based on 
untabulated results, we find performance improvements for periods of 1 to 7 years post-
M&A for target shareholders of money-market funds. No noticeable changes in 
performance occur for merging fund shareholders over all terms. Deals completed in the 
1980s lead to an increase (decrease) in the SDF alpha for the 1-year (5- and 7-year) term 
for target (merging fund) shareholders. For deals completed in the 1990s, the increase in 
performance occurs 2 years post-M&A for target shareholders, and a significant decrease 
occurs after 7 and 10 years post-M&A for both M&A participants.
24
 Deals during the 
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 We did not examine the ten-year term for the other asset classes due to the small sample size for these 
subsamples. 
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2000s yield a performance improvement for all post-M&A terms (except the 10-year 
term) for the target, and only for the first year post-M&A for the merging fund. Size 
deciles show that the smallest deals exhibit no significant alpha changes, but that the 
largest decile of deals has an SDF alpha increase for the 1- and 7-year terms for target 
shareholders. 
Using the same definition of the dependent variable and the outcome of the 1-
factor model, the key variables for the success of money market fund M&As are the 
bidder MER (negative for all terms) and the target fund flows pre-M&A (negative for 2- 
to 7-year terms). For the 1 and 2-year terms post-M&A, the target MER is positively 
related to the odds of success. Hence, the operating inefficiency of the target leads to 
outperformance in the short-term, but the operating efficiency of the bidder leads to 
performance success in both the short-and long-runs. Also, the funds-flow effect 
hypothesis is not rejected for this category of funds. The relationships between bidder 
MER for all terms, as well as the post-M&A bidder risk at the 5-year term, and the odds 
of success are robust to the choice of the specification of pricing kernel for money market 
fund performance evaluation. We also run the regression with a smaller number of 
regressors drawn from the characteristics of both M&A participants. These include age at 
the deal date, the prior performance of the target, the risk over the corresponding term, 
and the average MER. The dependent variable is first based on the one-factor model and 
second based on the momentum model. The bidder MER remains significantly and 
negatively related to the post-M&A performance (probability values range from 0.00 to 
0.09) for all terms and both models. Also, the target risk at the 1-year term, and the 
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bidder post-M&A risk at the 5- and 7-year terms are positively related to the success odds 
for both models. 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
This study examines M&A activity in the US mutual fund industry over a 48-year 
period. The performance enhancement hypothesis is tested for GMM estimates of 
abnormal performance under the stochastic discount factor approach. We find little 
evidence of significant abnormal performance, but its occurrence primarily benefits target 
unitholders as shown in the literature for other industries.  
The smooth transition hypothesis is not supported based on various downside risk 
comparisons since the acquirer’s and the target’s risk increases significantly around an 
M&A. The pre- to post-M&A shift in risk is not compatible with a significantly higher 
abnormal performance. Furthermore, acquirers displaying greater risk tolerance, in terms 
of portfolio holdings post-M&A, have less efficient asset portfolios. 
Determinants of success vary somewhat as the period over which abnormal 
performance post-M&A is estimated. Data over the lifetimes of funds prove that the fund 
flow effect hypothesis can not be rejected in that M&A success is negatively related to 
the mean fund flows prior to M&A. Over a 1-year period post-M&A, the diseconomies of 
scale hypothesis is accepted. Also, M&A success is negatively (positively) related to the 
market state at the time of the deal conclusion over the short-term (longer term) post-
M&A showing that the window of opportunity hypothesis could not be rejected. Finally, 
we find a consistent negative (positive) relationship between post-M&A bidder risk 
(target past performance) and M&A success. 
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 Tests of robustness find that the bidder’s size, the target’s MER and the family 
indicator are significantly (and positively) related to M&A success as measured by 
objective-adjusted returns when the sample is reduced to only acquiring funds who 
survived for at least seven years post-M&A. Post-M&A risk of the bidder negatively 
affects the odds of success. The target’s MER and the bidder’s size at the deal date are 
important in predicting M&A success over the first three years post-M&A for this seven-
year subsample. Reputation as proxied by the size and the level of expenses imposed on 
target shareholders pre-M&A also has significant power in explaining the longer-term 








The literature reports an asymmetric relationship between performance and net 
fund flows. The relationship is positive for outperformance and net fund flows, implying 
that investors chase winners (Sapp and Tiwari, 2004). In contrast, values in the far left 
tail of the performance distribution have little impact on net fund flows (Ippolito, 1992; 
Sirri and Tufano, 1998). In other words, investor demand for additional mutual fund 
investments is inelastic to performance below a certain minimum threshold. Lynch and 
Musto (2003) explain this phenomenon by investor perceptions that bad and very bad 
returns signal a potential change in strategy, hence the magnitude of their difference has 
little predictive power.  
Each of the last two decades has experienced an economic recession that has 
impacted fund performance and possibly the relation between net fund flows and 
performance conditioned on the state of the economy. Given that the literature has not 
sufficiently addressed the nature of this relationship to date, the primary purpose of this 
paper is to examine the relationship between recessionary period fund performance and 
subsequent non-recessionary period net fund flows for U.S. equity mutual funds around 
the two most recent U.S. economic recessions. This allows us to address two related 
questions. First, are subsequent non-recessionary period net fund flows to equity funds 
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related to their absolute and/or objective-adjusted
25
 (henceforth relative) return 
performances during recessionary periods? Are funds that are able to outperform peers 
during economic recessions able to attract more net cash flows during subsequent 
economic “good times”? 
We conjecture that absolute and relative returns are the only variables observed 
and used by fund investors through updated factsheets made available to them on a 
monthly or quarterly basis. We focus on these variables because fund investors are much 
less likely to resort to sophisticated (risk-adjusted) estimation methods for fund 
performance when making their fund allocation decisions.  
We study the relationship between performance and net fund flows (henceforth, 
the “two variables”) over their whole distributions, and over their lower and upper tails 
separately. The dependence between variables is examined via correlations and the 
copulas method. The linear correlation measures (parametric and non-parametric) provide 
a first assessment of the relationship (if any) between the variables. Since “copulas 
contain all the information about the dependence structure of a vector of random 
variables” (Rodriguez, 2007, p.403), we invoke a normal joint distribution assumption 
between these two variables and simulate bivariate Gaussian copulas. Then, we relax the 
normality assumption and use the non-parametric method to estimate empirical copulas. 




This paper contributes to the literature by examining the behavior of net fund 
flows and fund performances around two recent economic recessions in the U.S. Previous 
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 Thereafter, we use “objective-adjusted”, “peer-relative” and “relative” interchangeably to indicate that 
the variable is adjusted for the investment objective benchmark.  
26
 See Genest et al. (2009) for a review of the literature on the use of copulas in finance. 
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papers study the relations between current fund flows and future fund performance 
(Gruber, 1996; Zheng, 1999), or the reverse relationship by controlling for certain 
variables such as participation costs (Huang et al., 2007) or management changes 
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999). To our knowledge, the dependence between these two 
variables has not been studied using the copulas method, especially around “economic 
recessions”, where the ability of funds to weather adverse economic conditions may be  
rewarded in subsequent non-recessionary periods through increased net fund flows.  
Our major findings show significant differences between both covered 
recessionary periods and between both return and fund flows measures. First, the Early 
2000 Recession yields a positive correlation between during-recessionary period absolute 
returns and post-recessionary period absolute fund flows and a negative linear 
dependence between objective-adjusted variables, suggesting that higher performance 
during downturns is rewarded by subsequent higher money flows on an absolute basis 
and that investors direct less new cash to outperformers on a peer-relative basis. On 
absolute and relative bases, performance positively impacts post-Great Recession fund 
flows according to the non-parametric measures. Second, extreme left and right regions 
of the tails of the peer-relative distributions are associated with negative dependence for 
both recessionary periods. Median Gaussian copulas for the absolute variables show a 
positive (negative) dependence in the 1% left (right) tail for the Early 2000 Recession. 
The right and left 1% tail dependence for the Great Recession is positive. Empirical 
copulas in the extreme left tail exhibit a positive dependence for the Early 2000 
Recession and independence for the Great Recession between performance and new cash. 
Third, survival copulas show an overall positive dependence on an absolute basis and a 
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negative dependence on an objective-adjusted basis in the right region. Fourth, our initial 
findings are robust to the use of estimated Student copulas between bootstrapped 
variables instead of Gaussian copulas and the choice of the announcement date that a 
recession has begun instead of the official date of the recession. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The sample, data and some 
summary statistics are presented in the next section. The test methodology used herein is 
described in section three. Section four presents and analyzes the empirical results. 
Section five concludes the paper. 
4.2. SAMPLE, DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
The paper examines the relation between absolute and relative net fund flows and 
return performance for U.S. equity funds with Lipper objective codes around two U.S. 
economic recessions officially identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER).
27
 They are the Early 2000 economic recession that covered the eight-month 
period of March 2001 to November 2001 and the Great Recession that covered the 18-
month period of December 2007 to June 2009. A fund is excluded from each recession-
specific sample if: (1) monthly returns and Total Net Assets (TNA) are not available for 
the fund around the specific economic recession, and (2) the class of assets invested in by 
the fund is not equity. To ensure that only equity funds are included in the sample and to 
avoid any selection errors embedded in the original data source, we only include the 
funds whose equity holdings exceed 75% of their portfolio holdings.  
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A recession is bound by a peak and a trough in economic activity. According to the NBER dating 
committee, these turning points are determined using four broad indicators: industrial production, real 
manufacturing and retail trade sales, real personal income less transfer payments, and payroll employment. 
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The monthly fund flows are calculated using monthly TNA and returns data 
obtained from the CRSP survivor-bias-free U.S. mutual fund database.
28
 Dates are also 
subject to verification since some inconsistencies have been detected; e.g., incoherence 
between inception (call) and attrition (end) dates. Interpolation is used when TNA 
information is missing but monthly values are reported around the missing month. The 
redundancy problem in the sample is eliminated by constructing a size-weighted return of 
different classes of shares of funds when they are associated with a unique portfolio.
29
 
The TNA are needed to construct the benchmarks in order to calculate the objective-
adjusted performance and fund flows. 
The sample of equity funds is subdivided into 12 categories of fund objectives 
according to various combinations of capitalization (large, mid, small, and multi) and 
value (growth, core and value) following the Morningstar categorization.
30
 Objective-
adjusted (relative) returns and fund flows are obtained by first constructing size-weighted 
portfolios of mutual funds in each of the 12 categories of investment styles without 
requiring included funds to have survived the recession or to have been operating prior to 
the recession. The monthly return or net fund flows of the matched size-weighted 
portfolio is then subtracted from the corresponding return or net fund flows for the 
subject fund. The final sample of 4,766 funds consists of 417 small-growth, 470 small-
core, 214 small-value, 382 mid-growth, 270 mid-core, 140 mid-value, 646 large-growth, 
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 Specifically,  1 1(1 )t t t t tFund Flow TNA TNA r TNA    , where TNAt is the total net assets at the 
end of month t; and rt is the monthly return for month t. 
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 Each portfolio in the CRSP database, whether associated or not to a different class of shares for the same 
underlying portfolio, is assigned a unique identifier. The portfolio mapping is available as of year 2003; 
hence all cases prior to this date are not subject to the size-weighting treatment. The effect of this 
deficiency will be tested in a subsequent version of this paper. 
30
 The exact Lipper objective codes corresponding to the sub-sample selection criteria are the following : 
LCVE (Large-Value), LCCE (Large-Core), LCGE (Large-Growth), MCVE (Mid-Value), MCCE (Mid-
Core), MCGE (Mid-Growth), SCVE (Small-Value), SCCE (Small-Core), SCGE (Small-Growth), MLVE 
(Multi-Value), MLCE (Multi-Core) and MLGE (Multi-Growth). 
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727 large-core, 394 large-value, 450 multi-growth, 298 multi-core and 358 multi-value 
funds.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for monthly returns and fund flows around 
both recessions (events). Dispersions of returns (absolute and relative) for the pre- and 
post-Early 2000 Recession are significantly higher than those prevailing during the 
recession. They are not significantly different for the Great Recession. The skewness of 
absolute returns is statistically higher and positive post-Great Recession than pre- and 
within-recessionary periods (p<0.001), but statistically unchanged around the Early 2000 
Recession. For relative returns, the skewness and kurtosis are not statistically different 
between the three periods for both recessions. For the Early 2000 Recession, absolute 
(relative) returns of the large-growth funds show a substantial change in kurtosis from 




[Please place Table 4.1 about here] 
Among the second through fourth moment, only the pre- and post-event skewness 
measures of absolute fund flows are significantly different (lower and negative) than for 
the recessionary periods. The objective-adjusted fund flows yield a different 
interpretation. The Early 2000 Recession yields a significantly higher standard deviation 
(263.69% and 118.65% respectively) and kurtosis (61.10 and 13.27 respectively) pre- and 
post-event; and higher positive skewness measures post-event (1.72). The fund flows 
around the Great Recession exhibit higher standard deviations (339.40%) and less 
prevalent extreme values (5.29) post-event.  
                                                 
31
 For the sake of brevity, results of subsample characteristics are not reported in the paper but are available 
upon request.  
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The left percentiles of the absolute within-recessionary period net fund flows are 
significantly higher than their post-recessionary period counterparts for both recessionary 
periods ($-10.43 million versus $-184.64 million for the Early 2000 Recession and $-
115.83 million versus $-221.88 million for the Great Recession), accompanied with a 
different pattern for the left percentiles of returns (-3.24% versus -5.67% for the first 
recession and -5.08% versus 0.44% for the second recession). The resulting inference is 
that the most risk-averse investors react to a downturn in the form of massive post-
recessionary period share redemptions, when the poor fund performance becomes more 
extreme in the Early 2000 Recession and improves in the Great Recession. The objective-
adjusted variables do not show any significant difference between the left percentiles of 
fund flows, and exhibit substantial changes in returns (-2.41% versus -3.64%) around the 
Early 2000 Recession. In contrast, there are significant changes in the left percentile of 
objective-adjusted fund flows ($-413.13 million versus $-1053.47 million) and not their 
returns (-1.86% versus -1.50%) during the Great Recession. 
The 99% percentile of absolute fund flows for the within-Early 2000 Recession of 
$177.25 million is significantly higher than its subsequent post-recessionary period 
values. In contrast, there is no significant change in the 99% percentile of absolute returns 
(1.71% versus 1.88%). Nevertheless, the 1% right tail of the objective-adjusted fund 
flows for the within-Early 2000 Recession of $82.09 million is significantly lower than 
its post-recession value ($407.07 million), even though the objective-adjusted returns for 
the same distribution region are not statistically different (2.17% versus 2.21%). This 
outcome suggests that volatility during the downturn causes greater positive extremes in 
fund flows on an absolute basis, because of the greater level of risk attached to mutual 
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fund investment. Even with an unchanged performance post-recession, depressed 
investor sentiment leads to lower extreme net flow levels post-recession. On an objective-
adjusted basis, the net fund flow extreme levels are higher but not accompanied with 
higher adjusted returns. The sample shows that growth-oriented funds are the most 
representative of this phenomenon with a change in objective-adjusted fund flows from 
$106.88 to $697.61 million and returns from 1.90% to 2.34% from the within to the post-
recessionary period.  
Around the Great Recession, the 99% percentile absolute net fund flow decreases 
significantly from $151.24 million to $54.89 million while the absolute returns increase 
from -0.62% to 6.83%. Objective-adjusted variables for the Great Recession show muted 
changes. This result shows how investors shaped their behavior differently in the late 
versus early 2000 recession. Even with a significantly higher performance, the eroded 
confidence of mutual fund investors kept the extreme new cash levels from flowing to 
equity mutual funds following the more recent recession. 
Table 1 shows that absolute fund flows during the Great Recession are as volatile 
and more leptokurtic (81.15 versus 62.46) and less positively skewed (3.56 versus 6.64) 
compared to their counterparts during the Early 2000 Recession. Absolute returns 
dispersion, asymmetry and the prevalence of extreme values are not statistically different 
from one recession to the other. Nevertheless, for the Early 2000 Recession, objective-
adjusted returns reflect higher volatility (0.83% versus 0.57%) and objective-adjusted 
fund flows reflect higher skewness (0.97 versus -1.56) and kurtosis levels (8.50 vs 5.79) 
than for the Great Recession. Therefore, on an objective-adjusted basis, more return 
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variability is associated with unchanged fund flow volatility but increased higher-order 
moments. 
4.3. METHODOLOGY 
Correlations between event mean returns and post-event mean fund flows are 
measured using three metrics. While the Pearson correlation is an effective way to 
represent comovements between variables if they are linked by linear relationships, it 
may be severely flawed in the presence of non-linear links. In order to test whether the 
relationship between performance in recessionary periods and net cash flows in the 
following recovery periods is robust regardless of the method utilized to measure co-
movements, we examine non-parametric dependence measures. We estimate Spearman’s 
rho and Kendall tau, which do not depend on the marginal probability distributions 
(Cherubini et al., 2004).  
As a further check, we examine the relationship between recessionary period 
performance and subsequent recovery period net fund flows using copulas. This enables 
us to tackle the problem of specification of marginal univariate distributions separately 
from the specification of the comovement and dependence of the variables. For this 
reason, copulas are also called dependence functions (Deheuvels, 1978). The use of 
copula functions enables us to capture non-linear relationships among variables, if any. 
We estimate copulas on bootstrapped variables by sampling with replacement 
over 1000 paths. We begin with the Gaussian copula to determine the characteristics of 
the relationship between returns and net fund flows. With the Gaussian copula, we can 
preserve the dependence structure typical of a multivariate normal distribution by 
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modifying only the marginal distributions, which can be allowed to display skewness and 
fat-tail behavior consistent with the observed data. 
According to Sklar’s theorem, any joint probability distribution can be written in 
terms of a copula function taking the marginal distributions as arguments and, 
conversely, any copula function taking univariate probability distributions as arguments 
yields a joint distribution. Therefore, in order to estimate empirical copulas, we compute 
the empirical joint distributions (i.e. their joint cumulated frequencies). All estimations 
are based on means of recession-period returns and post-recession-period net fund flows 
over time periods of equal length.  
We determine level curves (1%, 5%, 50% and 75%) corresponding to the joint 
cumulative distributions. We consider the theoretical Fréchet bounds for level curves by 
estimating those corresponding to extreme cases of independence and perfect 
dependence; namely, product, minimum and maximum copulas (Fréchet, 1935, 1951; 
Hoeffding, 1940). For the 1% level, we superpose the following curves: 
(1) Perfect positive dependence or comonotonicity 
 
 



























































We also estimate survival copulas, which are defined as follows:  
 
When computed at (1 – ν, 1 – z), we obtain the probability for two standard uniform 




As defined above, the survival copula represents the joint survival probability of 
two variables beyond thresholds x and y. The objective is to examine the relationship 
between recessionary-period performance and post-recessionary period net cash flows in 
the upper tail.  
4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Based on Table 2, the three correlation measures for the absolute variables are 
positive but only significant for the Early 2000 recession. In contrast, the three sets of 
correlations between within-recessionary period relative performance and post-
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recessionary period net fund flows are significant but negative for the Early 2000 
recession and positive for the Great Recession. The Early 2000 Recession results are 
driven by the small-core, large-growth, multi-growth and multi-value funds, whereas the 
Great Recession results are driven by multi-growth funds. 
[Please place Table 4.2 about here] 
These results are only suggestive for a number of reasons. First, the correlations 
are based on the whole distributions, and idiosyncrasies associated with either recession 
can provide different inferences. Second, the Great Recession was much longer than the 
Early 2000 recession (18 versus 8 months), which could have affected the perceptions of 
investors and their sentiments. A behavioural argument to this disparity between the two 
examined recessionary periods is that investors regained an appetite for risk by the end of 
the Great Recession and re-injected cash in the mutual fund industry given the perception 
that the downturn had ended and financial markets were in recovery. The median relative 
return for the Early 2000 Recession of 0.01%, which is statistically higher than -0.06% 
for the Great Recession homolog, suggests either a change in investor sentiment or a 
substantial difference in the tail-dependence between performance and fund flows (see 
Table 1). We now examine the latter conjecture. 
Table 3 and figure 1 report on the distributions of Gaussian copulas between 
bootstrapped recession period returns and post-recession period fund flows. Based on the 
relative variables, the median copulas for the 1% left and right tails are significantly 
different for both recessions with a lower negative value for the left tail for the Early 
2000 recession and for the right tail for the Great Recession. For the absolute variables, 
similar comparisons for each considered quartile-tail produce similar results in terms of 
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significance. While the left tail median copulas are positive for both recessions, those for 




[Please place Table 4.3 and Figures 4.1 & 4.2 about here] 
Figure 3 shows the cumulative joint distribution functions of returns and net fund 
flows, and the level curves for copulas at values of 1%, 5%, 50% and 75% for both 
recessions. At low probability levels, there are irregularities in the empirical joint 
distributions, whereas the shape of the level curves is closer to normal distributions at 
higher levels. For absolute (objective-adjusted) monthly during-recessionary period 
returns lower than -1% for the Early 2000 Recession, there is a 1% probability that post-
recession period  monthly fund flows will be lower than $-100.85 million ($-82.18 
million). The impact of such negative absolute (objective-adjusted) monthly performance 
is accompanied by fund flows less than $-218.80 million ($-60.86 million) for the Great 
Recession.  
[Please place Figure 4.3 about here] 
The survival copulas analysis shows that there is 1% probability that post-
recessionary period fund flows will be higher than $-130.94 million ($-6.00 million) 
when absolute (objective-adjusted) monthly during-recessionary period returns are higher 
than -1% for the Early 2000 Recession. In the Great Recession, the associated fund flows 
amount to $-214.99 ($-120.88) million. The 32% percentile of absolute returns 
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 Given that the within-recessionary average performance and post-recessionary period fund flows do not 
follow normal marginal distributions, we estimated Student copulas between bootstrapped variables. The 
outcomes are qualitatively similar to the outcomes using Gaussian copulas. The left-tail median copulas are 
positive for absolute variables and both crises, whereas the right-tail median copulas are negative for the 
Early 2000 Recession and positive for the Great Recession. Relative variables show negative dependence, 
on average, at the 1% left and right tails for both recessions. 
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corresponds to the 2
nd
 percentile of net fund flows during the Early 2000 Recession, and 
the 75
th
 percentile of absolute returns corresponds to the 2
nd
 percentile of net fund flows 
during the Great Recession. The relationships between the two variables differ for 
objective-adjusted returns. Specifically, the 3
rd
 percentile of objective-adjusted returns 
matches the 24
th
 percentile for net fund flows for the Great Recession, and the 9
th
 
percentile of objective-adjusted returns associates with the 19
th
 percentile of net fund 
flows for the Early 2000 Recession. Given this separation between joint and marginal 
distributions, we draw two inferences: first, the absolute and objective-adjusted variables 
exhibit different relationships, and the relationships for the Early 2000 Recession and 
Great Recession are significantly different. 
Figure 4 depicts the copulas and survival copulas at 1% superposed with the 
Fréchet bounds and independence curves. For absolute returns, the empirical copulas at 
the 1% level are significantly far from the so-called bounds and from the independence 
curve for the Early 2000 Recession. The empirical absolute variables infer a positive 
relationship between during-recessionary period absolute returns and post-recessionary 
period net fund flows at the tail. This result differs for the Great Recession where the data 
show independence between absolute-return performance and net fund flows. For the 
objective-adjusted variables, the empirical copulas at 1% are significantly different from 
perfect concordance (but not from independence) for the Great Recession. In contrast, the 
empirical 1% level curve for the objective-adjusted variables lies between perfect 
positive correlation (p-value<0.001) and independence (p-value=0.03) for the Early 2000 
Recession.  
[Please place Figure 4.4 about here] 
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Survival copulas at the 1% level for the absolute variables are significantly far 
from the bounds and independence curve (p-value<0.001), which indicates a positive 
relationship between during-recessionary period returns and post-recessionary period 
fund flows. This result is found for both recessions separately. For the objective-adjusted 
variables in the Great Recession, the survival rate curve at 1% is significantly away from 
the bounds (p-values<0.001) but not significantly distinct from the independence curve 
(p-value=0.89). The corresponding result differs for the Early 2000 Recession, where the 
relationship is significantly negative (see Table 4). 
[Please place Table 4.4 about here] 
Based on the copulas between absolute variables at 1% for the different categories 
of funds for the Early 2000 Recession, there is a positive dependence between during-
recessionary period returns and post-recessionary period net fund flows for core funds 
(except those that are large) and value funds (except those that are small). Growth funds 
do not show a consistent relationship, since the relationship is positive for small and 
medium funds, non-existent for large funds, and negative for not-size-sorted funds.
33
 The 
large and multi-cap funds and the value funds in the two remaining size categories yield 
independence for the Great Recession. In contrast, the relation is negative for small and 
medium, growth and core funds. On an absolute basis, only large- growth and core funds 
and small-value funds exhibit a similar independent relationship around both recessions. 
The sign of the relationship changes from positive to negative for small and medium, 
growth and core funds from the Early 2000 Recession to the Great Recession, and 
disappears for the other categories of funds. 
                                                 
33
 When p-values are not mentioned, we implicitly mean that they are lower than 0.05. 
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The relationships between the objective-adjusted variables for the Early 2000 
Recession show that small and medium funds yield positive dependence when holdings 
are in the growth and core category, but do not exhibit dependence when funds are 
invested in value funds. Not-size-sorted funds yield three types of relationships: negative 
for growth, positive for core and no relationship for value funds. For the Great Recession, 
only small-value, multi-cap- value and core funds maintain the same type of relationship 
as for the Early 2000 Recession. The relationships for small growth and core funds turns 
from positive to negative, and that for medium growth and core funds turns from positive 
to no relationship (see Table 4). 
Finally, the survival copulas for the absolute variables for the Early 2000 
Recession exhibit a positive dependence except for small- and medium-value funds. The 
relationships based on the Great Recession are positive except for small-value, mid- core 
and value, and multi-cap- growth and core funds which exhibit independence. Based on 
the survival copulas and using objective-adjusted variables for the Early 2000 Recession, 
all core funds as well as small-growth, large-value and multi-value funds exhibit positive 
relationships. For the Great Recession, only small-, mid- and large- growth funds keep 
the same relationships of respectively positive, none and negative. Also, independence is 
exhibited by all but multi-cap core funds and all but mid-value funds.  
4.5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section, we conduct robustness tests for the relationships between 
performance in bad times and fund flows in subsequent good times. Instead of 
considering the official dates of the beginning and end of each recession, one could claim 
that the announcement dates may have more impact on investor demand for mutual 
 77 
funds. The Business Cycle Dating Committee members of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research meet regularly in order to determine the trough or the peak in 
business activity of the US economy. Consequently, the committee publishes a report 
about the dates of turning points in the US economy. For the Early 2000 Recession, the 
peak was announced in November 2001 and the trough was announced in July 2003, 
changing the duration of this event from 8 months to 20 months. For the Great Recession, 
the peak was announced on December 2008 and the trough was announced on September 
2010, changing its duration from 18 months to 19 months. All these findings are 
untabulated but are available upon request. 
For both recessions, dispersions of post-crisis absolute fund returns are 
significantly higher than their within-recessionary period homologs. The skewness of 
absolute returns is statistically higher and positive post-Great Recession than for the pre- 
and within-recessionary period (p-value= 0.02), but statistically unchanged around the 
Early 2000 Recession (as reported earlier using the official dates). For relative returns, 
the skewness and kurtosis are not statistically different between the three periods for both 
recessions.  
For both measures of fund flows and both events, the dispersion of net fund flows 
is significantly higher post-recessionary period than within, as was reported earlier for the 
official dates. Skewness of absolute fund flows is lower and negative post-Early 2000 
Recession than within-recessionary period, but unchanged elsewhere. Kurtosis post-
recessionary period is unchanged for the Early 200 Recession (absolute and relative), but 
significantly exceeds its counterpart within the most recent recession (absolute and 
relative).  
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The left percentiles of the absolute post-recessionary period net fund flows are 
unchanged relative to their within-recessionary period homologs for both events, whereas 
the left percentiles of absolute returns increase substantially around recessions (p-value < 
0.001). This result confirms the inelasticity of demand at the far left of the distribution of 
returns documented in the literature. Nevertheless, objective-adjusted variables show that 
the left percentiles of within-recessionary period fund flows are higher than their post-
event counterparts for both recessions (p-value=0.05 for each event). The left percentile 
of objective-adjusted returns follows the same pattern in the Great Recession only.  
The right percentile of absolute fund flows and returns for both recessions are 
significantly lower than their subsequent post-recessionary period values. Although, there 
is no significant change in the right percentile of objective-adjusted fund flows, the 
corresponding percentile of returns decreases around the Early 2000 Recession (p-value = 
0.05). The Great recession relative variables follow the same pattern as the absolute ones.  
Absolute and relative fund flows post-Great Recession are more volatile (548.72 
versus 21.36), more negatively skewed (-8.48 versus -4.56) and more leptokurtic (208.89 
versus 80.91) than their counterparts in the post-Early 2000 Recession. Absolute returns 
reflect higher volatility during the Great Recession (1.03% versus 0.59%), a lower and 
negative skewness (-1.20 versus 0.42) and a statistically similar kurtosis (4.67 versus 
4.12) than their counterparts in the Early 2000 Recession. The second and third moments 
of objective-adjusted returns follow the same pattern, but the prevalence of extreme 
values is significantly lower in the Great Recession compared to the Early 2000 one (4.97 
versus 5.78). 
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Parametric correlations between during-recession performance and post-
recessionary fund flows are not significant for the sample as a whole. Non-parametric 
correlations are positive and significant with objective-adjusted variables or the Early 
2000 Recession and with absolute variables for the Great Recession. When we consider 
the subcategories of funds, we find that with absolute variables, the three sets of 
correlations are significantly positive for large-core and multi-value funds in the Early 
2000 Recession. With objective-adjusted variables for the same event, parametric and 
non-parametric correlations are positive and significant for mid-core, large-growth and 
core, multi-growth and core funds, but negative for small-growth funds. For the second 
crisis, there is no instance where all sets of correlations are significant. With absolute 
variables, the Spearman and Kendall measures are significantly positive for small-value, 
large-growth and multi-value funds. With objective-adjusted variables, large-growth 
funds keep the positive correlations with respective p-values of 0.04 and 0.05, but multi-
value funds show negative correlations with respective p-values of 0.01 and 0.02.  
The median of Gaussian copulas for the 1% left tail is significantly lower (higher) 
around the Early 2000 Recession compared to the Great Recession with (relative) 
absolute variables. The 1% right tails do not show any difference between the two events 
and are significantly positive. 
The empirical copulas at the 1% level show that absolute (relative) returns lower 
than -1% are associated with net fund flows lower than -0.07 million (-18.09 million) 
dollars for the Early 2000 Recession and  lower than 0.72 million (-147.69 million) 
dollars for the Great Recession. The survival copulas analysis for when returns are higher 
than -1% shows that there is a 1% probability that post-recessionary period absolute 
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(relative) fund flows are higher than -1.02 million (-14.23 million) dollars for the Early 
2000 Recession and 5.32 million (-573.88 million) for the Great Recession. 
The positive dependence between within-recessionary period absolute returns and 
post-recessionary period fund flows for the Early 2000 Recession is consistent with the 
outcome of the analysis using the official economic trough and peak dates. This 
relationship is driven by growth-oriented, as well as mid- and multi-value funds. Also, 
the independence between both variables for the Great Recession confirms the results 
found with the initial period delineations. This relationship is driven by mid- and large-
growth funds.  
We find the same relationships as found earlier using the relative variables. For 
the Early 2000 Recession, the results are driven by small-growth, mid-core, large-core, 
multi-growth and multi-value funds. For the Great Recession, the results are driven by 
mid-growth, mid-value, large-growth and multi-growth funds. 
Survival copulas at the 1% level for the absolute variables indicate a positive 
dependence between within-recessionary period returns and subsequent fund flows for 
both recessions. Although the sign of the relationship remains the same with relative 
variables for the Early 2000 Recession, the right-tail dependence fades in the most recent 
recession. This independence is driven by small-value, mid-growth, mid-core, large-core, 
large-value and multi-value funds.    
4.6. CONCLUSION 
We study the relationship between performance and net fund flows for U.S. 
equity mutual funds for both the Early 2000 Recession and the Great Recession. We use 
the copulas method in order to examine the dependence in the tails of distributions in 
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order to draw inferences about whether or not the behavior of new cash inflows 
subsequent to such downturns is significantly related to the performance during such 
periods of turmoil. 
The triggers of each recession differed. The Early 2000 Recession stems from the 
dissipation of the price bubble for high-tech stocks. The Great Recession was more global 
since it was triggered to a large extent by excessive non-transparent securitization of 
mortgage debts which ultimately affected real estate markets and the banking system. 
For the Early 2000 Recession, there is a positive correlation between during-
recessionary period absolute returns and post-recessionary period absolute fund flows and 
a negative linear dependence between objective-adjusted measures of these variables. 
Higher absolute fund performance during this economic downturn is subsequently 
followed by higher money flows. In contrast, investors seem to direct less new cash to 
outperformers after this recession when the assessment is on a peer-relative basis. For the 
Great Recession, the non-parametric absolute and relative relationships between these 
two variables are positive and significant but the parametric linear relationships are not 
significant. 
At the tails of the distributions of peer-relative variables, extreme left and right 
regions exhibit negative dependence for both recessions. Median Gaussian copulas for 
the absolute variables show a positive dependence in the 1% left tail for the absolute 
variables for both recessions, and negative and positive dependence in the 1% right tail 
for the Early 2000 Recession and Great Recession, respectively. Empirical copulas show 
a positive dependence in the extreme left tail for the Early 2000 Recession, due primarily 
to value and core funds when measured on an absolute and objective-adjusted basis, 
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respectively. The Great Recession is characterized by the independence of fund 
performance and subsequent fund flows, driven primarily by value funds for absolute 
measurements and medium funds for relative measurements. The survival copulas show 
an overall positive dependence on an absolute basis (including the upper tails), and a 






In this thesis, we study three major issues in the US mutual fund industry: (1) 
performance evaluation, (2) the M&A activity and (3) the fund flow behaviour 
subsequent to recessions. In the first essay, we find that the stochastic discount factor 
(SDF) approach is consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis. Expected mutual 
fund returns are unpredictable and money managers do not demonstrate superior ability 
to time the market and exploit mispricings and misperceptions. With regard to the 
different SDF specifications, we find that the four-factor Carhart model (followed by the 
three-factor Fama-French model) is best suited for assessing the performance of the 
mutual fund dataset. The use of the Carhart model results in the least pricing errors on 
average and produces the largest number of cases in the admissible region of SDF mean-
variance. 
In the second essay, we examine M&A activity in the US mutual fund industry 
over a 48-year period. The performance enhancement hypothesis is tested for GMM 
estimates of abnormal performance under the SDF approach. We find little evidence of 
significant abnormal performance, but its occurrence primarily benefits target unitholders 
as shown in the literature for other industries. The smooth transition hypothesis is not 
supported based on various downside risk comparisons since the acquirer’s and the 
target’s risk increases significantly post-M&A. The pre- to post-M&A shift in risk is not 
compatible with a significantly higher abnormal performance. Furthermore, acquirers 
displaying greater risk tolerance, in terms of portfolio holdings post-M&A, have less 
efficient asset portfolios. Data over the lifetimes of funds can not reject the fund-flow 
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effect hypothesis that M&A success is negatively related to the mean fund flows prior to 
M&A. Also, M&A success is negatively (positively) related to the market state at the 
time of the deal conclusion over the short-term (longer term) post-M&A showing that the 
window of opportunity hypothesis could not be rejected. Finally, we find a consistent 
negative (positive) relationship between post-M&A bidder risk (target past performance) 
and M&A success. 
In the third essay, we study the relationship between performance and net fund 
flows for U.S. equity mutual funds for both the Early 2000 Recession and the Great 
Recession. We use the copulas method in order to examine the dependence in the tails of 
distributions in order to draw inferences about whether or not the behavior of new cash 
inflows subsequent to such downturns is significantly related to the performance during 
such turmoils. For the Early 2000 Recession, there is a positive correlation between 
during-recessionary period absolute returns and post-recessionary period absolute fund 
flows and a negative linear dependence between objective-adjusted measures of these 
variables. Higher absolute fund performance during this economic downturn is 
subsequently followed by higher money flows. In contrast, investors seem to direct less 
new cash to outperformers after this recession when the assessment is on a peer-relative 
basis. For the Great Recession, the non-parametric absolute and relative relationships 
between these two variables are positive and significant but the parametric linear 
relationships are not significant. 
At the tails of the distributions of peer-relative variables, extreme left and right 
regions exhibit negative dependence for both recessions. Median Gaussian copulas for 
the absolute variables show a positive dependence in the 1% left tail for the absolute 
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variables for both recessions, and negative and positive dependence in the 1% right tail 
for the Early 2000 Recession and Great Recession, respectively. Empirical copulas show 
a positive dependence in the extreme left tail for the Early 2000 Recession, due primarily 
to value and core funds when measured on an absolute and objective-adjusted basis, 
respectively. The Great Recession is characterized by the independence of fund 
performance and subsequent fund flows, driven primarily by value funds for absolute 
measurements and medium funds for relative measurements. The survival copulas show 
an overall positive dependence on an absolute basis (including the upper tails), and a 
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Appendix A: Saturation Ratios 
 
Dahlquist and Söderlind (1999) define the saturation ratio as the total number of 
observations divided by the number of parameters to be estimated (including the number of 
parameters in the weighting matrix).
34
 Bekaert and Urias (1996, p. 846) point out that GMM-
systems with saturation ratios below ten are likely to have low power, even though they are 
common in empirical finance. We seek to maximize the power of our tests by maintaining 
suitable saturation ratios. We apply the GMM estimation on only one fund at a time. We repeat 
the iterative estimation process for every single equity and bond mutual fund to test the 
appropriateness of each candidate model, jointly with the existence of abnormal performance. 
Maintenance of an appropriate saturation ratio is one of the reasons why we choose to use only 
one information variable (short-term interest rate) to test the conditional version of the proposed 
candidate models.  
Given the ten-level barrier suggested in the literature, a suitable saturation ratio in our 
tests lies between 68 and 73 data points. We find that 44% (i.e., 6,553) of the equity funds and 
55% (i.e., 4,295) of the bond funds meet this condition. It is noteworthy that surviving funds 
offer large saturation ratios (between 72.00 and 79.11), making the subsample in question a 
reference for model ranking and testing. Given that the power of the tests applied to this 
subsample is stronger, it could buttress our acceptance of the null hypothesis of no superior 
ability in managing mutual funds when test statistics confirm it.  
                                                 
34
 It is equal to the ratio of the product of the number of conditions and length of data, divided by the number of 
parameters to be estimated. For example, for a fund with 100 posted monthly returns and a CAPM-like model in the 
unconditional setting, the saturation ratio of the GMM system equals: nc*T/((nv + 1)*k +1 + nc*(nc + 
1)/2)=12*100/(2*1 + 1 + 12*13/2) = 15. 
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Appendix B: Some Institutional Detail on US Mutual Funds Mergers 
 
Rule 17a-8, which was promulgated under the Investment Company Act of 1940, defines 
Merger as the merger, consolidation, or purchase or sale of substantially all of the assets between 
a registered investment company (or a series thereof) and another company. The parties of a 
merger are called the surviving company
35
 and the merging company, respectively. A merger 
consists of the transfer of all of the merging fund’s assets attributable to a certain class of shares 
to the surviving (“acquiring”) fund. The board of directors communicates with shareholders in 
order to vote on an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization for the Fund.
36
  
The Board of Directors of the merging company determines that the interests of the 
merging company’s existing shareholders will not be diluted as a result of the merger, given all 
pertinent factors. In making this determination, the directors have to approve procedures for the 
valuation of assets to be transferred. These procedures are used by an Independent Evaluator in 
order to assess the fair value of any securities (or other assets) for which market quotations are 
not readily available, as of the date of the merger.  
Participation in the merger has to be approved by the vote of a majority of the outstanding 
voting securities unless: (1) all policies and advisory contracts between the merging company 
and the investment advisers are not materially different for the merging and surviving 
companies; (2) elected directors of the merging company comprise a majority of the directors of 
the surviving company; and (3) 12b-1 distribution fees of the surviving company are not greater 
than those of the merging company.  
                                                 
35
 Surviving Company means “a company in which shareholders of a Merging Company will obtain an interest as a 
result of a Merger” (Rule 17a-8, Investment Company Act 1940). 
36
 See Appendix B of “Board Consideration of Fund Mergers”, June 2006. 
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If the plan of merger is approved, the shareholders of the merging funds become 
shareholders of the Surviving fund. The Surviving fund generally has management policies 
similar to the acquired fund. 
 
Appendix C: Bull-Bear Market Indicator 
 
Over the study period (1962-2009), the value-weighted portfolio of all non-ADR 
securities traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX constitutes the basis for the determination 
of bull/bear market conditions. Since there are no generally accepted formal definitions of bull 
and bear markets, we chose to adopt the one suggested by Lunde and Timmermann (2004), 
inspired by Sperandeo (1990), Chauvet and Potter (2000) and the financial press. The 
corresponding algorithm allows the identification of turning points from one state to another 
(from bull to bear and vice versa). 
Lunde and Timmermann (2004) use the stochastic process tracking the stock price as the 
underlying variable to determine the turning points. Suppose that the initial state at time t0 is the 
bull state and symbolize the corresponding market state indicator as 1
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If maxmin     then we update the local minimum price:  min0min0
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If minmax     then we update the local maximum price:  max0max0
max
   tt PP and 
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The scalar 1  ( 2 ) represents the threshold of movements in stock prices that trigger a 
switch from bear (bull) to bull (bear) market. Based on the financial press, as in Lunde and 
Timmermann (2004), we consider the conventionally used values and apply the filter (0.20, 
0.20). Hence, the state changes occur when stock price increases/decreases by 20%. 
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TABLES 
Table 2.1. Summary statistics 
This table provide various summary statistics for the nine risk factors time series employed to describe the 
pricing kernel. M stands for the market portfolio return. L stands for the human capital factor. SMB and 
HML are the size and value self-financing portfolios as constructed in Fama-French (1993). WML stands 
for the momentum trading strategy return. I stands for inflation-mimicking portfolio return. IP represents 
the Industrial Production-mimicking portfolio return. T represents the term structure-mimicking portfolio 
return. RM is the residual market risk factor, obtained after controlling for the four preceding risk sources. 
The statistics describing the following factors are in order: mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, 
minimum, maximum and first-order autocorrelation. They are calculated on the basis of the study period: 
January 1962 up to June 2006.  
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skew. Kurt. Min. Max. ρ1 
Market (M) 0.0045 0.0443 -0.4764 4.9417 -0.2313 0.1605 0.04830 
Labor income (L) 0.0050 0.0040 -0.6874 9.8721 -0.0205 0.0185 0.41743 
Size factor (SMB) 0.0023 0.0320 0.5294 8.4349 -0.1658 0.2187 -0.08155 
Value factor (HML) 0.0047 0.0288 -0.0057 5.5719 -0.1266 0.1371 0.06231 
Momentum factor (WML) 0.0084 0.0399 -0.6471 8.4710 -0.2505 0.1840 -0.07063 
Inflation (I) 0.0000 0.0289 0.0372 5.3188 -0.1064 0.1432 -0.01442 
Industrial production (IP) 0.0015 0.0284 0.3026 5.1713 -0.0989 0.1398 0.00544 
Term structure (T) -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0496 4.7707 -0.0031 0.0024 0.14381 
Residual market risk (RM) -0.0001 0.0009 -0.1287 4.5664 -0.0042 0.0031 0.00688 
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Table 2.2. Hansen-Jagannathan Volatility Bounds Diagnosis 
This table reports the percentage of cases (funds) with SDFs that are considered “variable enough” for the 
nine candidate models in (un)conditional settings for all non-missing-data equity mutual funds, as well as 
the special cases of funds with at least 180 data points. The objective is to eliminate outliers stemming 
from cases where the funds report very few monthly returns over their lifetime. CAPM stands for the 
single-factor linear pricing kernel. FAFR stands for the three-factor Fama-French model. APT stands for 
the arbitrage pricing theory-based model. LCAPM stands for the Jagannathan and Wang (1996) labor-
CAPM. WML stands for the four-factor Carhart model. CUB stands for the non linear cokurtosis-based 
model as proposed by Dittmar (2002). QUAD stands for the non-linear coskewness-based model as 
proposed by Harvey and Siddique (2000). L-CUB and L-QUAD represent labor-cubic and labor-
quadratic models respectively, as proposed by Fletcher and Forbes (2004). 
Percentage of cases where the mean-std is inside the HJ boundary (%) 
 Unconditional Conditional 
Models All More than 180 obs All More than 180 obs 
CAPM 0.88 7.61 0.74 10.11 
FAFR 5.32 83.07 4.38 64.77 
APT 0.18 2.95 0.18 2.95 
LCAPM 0.73 10.00 0.75 10.23 
WML 6.64 87.95 6.64 87.84 
CUB 0.73 9.89 0.73 10.00 
QUAD 0.73 9.89 0.74 10.11 
L-CUB 0.75 10.23 0.73 10.00 
L-QUAD 0.73 10.00 0.74 10.11 
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Table 2.3. The percentages of significant alphas 
This table reports the percentages of significant alphas for the nine candidate models for the 
(un)conditional setting. The sample size is 14,996 equity funds. Statistical significance is measured at the 
5% level. CAPM stands for the single-factor linear pricing kernel. FAFR stands for the three-factor Fama-
French model. APT stands for the arbitrage pricing theory-based model. LCAPM stands for the 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) labor-CAPM. WML stands for the four-factor Carhart model. CUB stands 
for the non linear cokurtosis-based model as proposed by Dittmar (2002). QUAD stands for the non-linear 
coskewness-based model as proposed by Harvey and Siddique (2000). L-CUB and L-QUAD represent 
labor-cubic and labor-quadratic models respectively, as proposed by Fletcher and Forbes(2004). 
Models Unconditional Conditional 
CAPM 1.30 1.13 
FAFR 1.09 0.41 
LCAPM 1.22 0.83 
APT 1.00 0.13 
WML 0.76 0.11 
CUB 1.12 0.79 
QUAD 1.11 0.69 
L-CUB 0.99 0.57 
L-QUAD 0.95 0.50 
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Table 2.4. Results for the four-index EGB model 
This table reports the percentages of funds whose mean-standard deviation are inside the HJ boundary 
and the percentages of funds with significant alphas for the (un)conditional setting for the four-index 
model for the full sample of equity funds and subsamples thereof consisting of funds with at least 180 
observations. The four factors in this model are: the stock market portfolio, the size portfolio, the value 
portfolio and the broad-based bond market portfolio. The sample sizes are 14,968 equity funds, 
respectively. Statistical significance is measured at the 5% level. Results are calculated on the basis of the 
subperiod January 1976 up to June 2006.  
  Unconditional Conditional 
 All More than 180 obs All More than 180 obs 
Mean-std inside the HJ boundary (%) 5.09 78.32 5.09 78.32 




Table 2.5. Alternative Investment Opportunity Set : 125 Wermers (2004) benchmarks 
The table represents the outcome of the SDF alpha estimation under (un)conditional setting and the HJ boundary test for equity funds (for the 
period 1975-2006) with an alternative IO set. Permissible% stands for the percentage of cases in the permissible region according to the HJ 
boundary. Permissible% (180-funds) stands for the same measure for funds reporting 180 datapoints or more. Sig alphas stands for the percentage 
of SDF alphas significant at the 95% confidence level. Positive Sig alphas represents the percentage of positive alphas among the significant cases. 
The addition of the mention 180-funds means that the measures concern only the funds that report 180 datapoints or more.  









Positive sig alphas 
(%) 
Sig Alphas (180-funds) 
% 
Positive sig alphas (180-funds) 
% 
FAFR 0.04 0.00  1.53 42.27 70.06 42.27 
CAPM 0.00 0.00  1.10 32.48 68.26 32.48 
JW 0.04 0.00  1.86 41.48 60.54 41.48 
WML 0.02 0.00  1.79 41.92 53.83 41.92 
APT 0.00 0.00  2.25 48.48 67.21 48.48 
Cub 0.85 24.73  2.03 45.08 62.90 45.08 
Quad 0.74 20.75  1.95 41.55 58.92 41.55 
Cub-L 0.81 22.98  2.07 46.51 62.32 46.51 
Quad-
L 
0.69 19.26  2.01 45.55 59.84 45.55 







Positive sig alphas 
(%) 
Sig Alphas (180-funds) 
% 
Positive sig alphas (180-funds) 
% 
FAFR 0.04 0.00  1.41 35.47 65.91 35.47 
CAPM 0.00 0.00  1.09 33.97 66.10 33.97 
JW 0.04 0.00  2.01 44.18 64.18 44.18 
WML 0.02 0.00  1.93 45.71 57.85 45.71 
APT 0.00 0.00  2.19 46.23 65.43 46.23 
Cub 0.87 24.9  2.17 49.05 66.11 49.05 
Quad 0.74 20.75  1.96 44.21 59.13 44.21 
Cub-L 0.81 22.84  2.10 47.87 62.76 47.87 
Quad-
L 
0.70 19.47  2.13 49.68 63.52 49.68 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics of target and merged funds rates of return over 
the period 1962-2009  
The table reports the cross-sectional average of mutual funds time-series descriptive statistics, except for 
the number of target and merged funds (n). Both samples of targets and merged funds are subdivided into 
five subsamples according to their investment style: equity, bond, money market, hybrid (or asset 
allocation), and convertible. “T” stands for the cross-sectional average of the number of regularly posted 
monthly returns for every in-sample fund. “Mean” represents the cross-sectional average of monthly return 
time-series means. “Median” is the cross-sectional average of monthly return time-series medians. “Min” is 
the cross-sectional average of monthly return minima. “Max” is the cross-sectional average of monthly 
return maxima. “Sigma” is the cross-sectional average of monthly returns time-series standard deviations. 
“Skew” is the cross-sectional average of (conventional) skewness measures of monthly returns. “Kurt” is 
the cross-sectional average of kurtosis measures of monthly returns. “Rho” is the cross-sectional average of 
first-order time series autocorrelations. All numbers are in percentages except for n, size, Skew, Kurt and 
Rho. Monthly returns, which are from the US Mutual Fund survivorship-bias-free CRSP database, are 
calculated as the change in the Net Asset Value per share including reinvested dividends from one month to 
the next and net of management expenses. 
 n T Mean Median Min Max Sigma Skew Kurt Rho 
Target Funds (statistics concern the period starting from inception up to merger completion) 
Total 6680 90 0.27 0.42 -10.68 9.63 3.81 -0.33 4.16 0.13 
Equity 3727 84 0.15 0.33 -16.05 14.22 5.74 -0.31 4.07 0.07 
Bond 2082 96 0.42 0.53 -3.75 3.84 1.31 -0.40 4.47 0.11 
Money 
Market 
423 117 0.39 0.39 0.15 0.70 0.14 0.05 3.22 0.88** 
Hybrid 420 91 0.47 0.67 -8.38 6.67 2.73 -0.52 4.40 0.05 
Convertible 28 78 0.06 0.14 -9.26 7.50 3.20 -0.44 4.71 0.14 
Merged Funds (statistics concern the period starting from the transaction dates up to either the end date of 
the study period or the delisting date) 
Total 4459 65 0.16 0.60 -11.53 8.51 4.12 -0.57 4.30 0.25 
Equity 2530 98 0.23 0.53 -13.43 10.69 3.88 -0.37 3.28 0.13 
Bond 1300 108 0.25 0.33 -3.68 3.00 0.91 -0.43 4.17 0.08 
Money 
Market 
322 145 0.22 0.24 0.01 0.49 0.12 -0.02 2.03 0.73** 
Hybrid 294 100 0.23 0.46 -8.26 5.28 2.14 -0.55 3.60 0.13 
Convertible 13 111 -0.02 0.16 -13.81 7.93 3.26 -0.91 6.61 0.19 
**significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 3.2.  Number of mergers with different participant investment styles 
The table represents the cases where a target fund is acquired by a mutual fund with a different investment 
style or objective. Investment styles are defined by the class of assets held by the mutual fund over the 
business life of the funds. The five investment styles are: Equity, Bond, Money Market, Hybrid and 
Convertible. To illustrate, 95 of the 3727 target equity funds merged with different-style funds (10 became 
bond funds, 1 a money market fund, 77 hybrid funds and 7 convertible funds). 
Style of Target Style of Acquiring Fund Style changes 
Equity Bond Money Market Hybrid Convertibles Total 
Equity  10 1 77 7 95 
Bond 12  8 11 1 32 
Money Market 2 5  0 0 7 
Hybrid 65 3 0  1 69 
Convertibles 11 3 0 8  22 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics for the size of the targets and merged funds at deal 
month-end dates 
The table reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional percentiles of the target and merged fund 
sizes at the time of the M&A transaction. The 2.5%, 50% and 97.5% percentiles of the fund Total Net 
Assets (TNA) are calculated each year over the period 1962-2009. The reported numbers are averages of 
these percentiles across time over the whole study period in table 3a, and for each of the four subperiods of 
1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000 and 2001-2009 in table 3b. The figures related to the subperiod 1962-
1970 are omitted since all their values are equal to zero. Both samples of targets and merged funds are 
subdivided into five subsamples according to their investment style: equity, bond, money market, hybrid 
(or asset allocation), and convertible. All averages of percentiles are in millions USD. By convention, the 
very small funds whose size is less than $100,000 report 0.01 as a monthly Total Net Assets. “n” stands for 
the average monthly (integer) number of target or merged funds over the respective periods. It is 
noteworthy that these statistics involve only those mutual funds for which the regularly reported monthly 
return, the investment style and TNA information are available. 
Table 3.3a. 
Period 
Targets Acquiring funds 
n 
(annually) 
2.5% 50% 97.5% 
n 
(annually) 
2.5% 50% 97.5% 
Total sample (4,621 cases) Total sample (3,256 cases) 
1962-2009 
159 57.70 67.21 306.67 165 82.28 157.71 1646.86 
1971-1980 
1 42.63 42.63 42.63 1 36.95 36.95 36.95 
1981-1990 
2 298.27 309.21 321.02 2 422.12 498.76 660.84 
1991-2000 
61 1.05 15.37 400.56 61 7.19 107.79 1688.29 
2001-2009 





Targets Acquiring funds 
n (annually) 2.5% 50% 97.5% n (annually) 2.5% 50% 97.5% 
Equity (2818) Equity (1989) 
1962-2009 113 3.01 10.64 181.04 112 15.45 81.95 1434.48 
1971-1980 1 4.50 4.50 4.50 1 36.95 36.95 36.95 
1981-1990 2 3.85 3.96 6.90 2 36.25 46.17 250.21 
1991-2000 24 5.30 17.16 162.73 23 19.38 113.28 824.18 
2001-2009 258 0.10 7.30 287.14 256 0.89 71.27 2700.90 
 Bond (1395) Bond funds (941) 
1962-2009 61 4.58 13.76 255.21 63 23.88 130.81 1628.90 
1971-1980 1 18.54 19.13 19.72 0 0 0 0 
1981-1990 35 3.25 14.72 350.05 2 192.78 205.38 217.99 
1991-2000 108 0.19 10.74 264.04 31 11.82 170.01 1580.39 
2001-2009 61 4.58 13.76 255.21 107 2.16 76.70 1959.60 
 Money Market (113) Money Market (102) 
1962-2009 8 184.56 249.85 1022.0
6 
7 825.42 1256.14 6408.23 
1971-1980 1 157.00 157.00 157.00 0 0.83 0.83 0.83 
1981-1990 1 762.60 762.60 762.60 1 813.22 813.22 813.22 
1991-2000 4 176.68 282.84 1025.07 4 1452.78 1869.81 3459.85 
2001-2009 14 4.34 61.41 1249.71 13 292.90 919.96 11333.26 
 Hybrid (282) Hybrid (216) 
1962-2009 17 45.54 58.51 254.08 18 104.08 285.41 1602.90 
1971-1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981-1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991-2000 5 110.37 128.68 223.91 5 248.17 494.05 1154.12 
2001-2009 25 0.16 9.39 275.19 28 3.21 139.37 1917.05 
 Convertibles (13) Convertibles (8) 
1962-2009 3 4.25 6.40 10.37 2 14.31 40.93 100.01 
1971-1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981-1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991-2000 1 15.46 15.46 15.46 3 5.85 8.69 29.35 
2001-2009 3 1.45 4.14 9.10 2 17.13 51.68 123.57 
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Table 3.4. Descriptive statistics of the MER of the targets and merged funds 
The table reports cross-sectional statistics for management expense ratios (MERs) of the target and merged 
funds with regularly posted monthly returns, investment style and MER information. All numbers are in 
percentages except for the skew and kurt measures. For mutual funds reporting different MERs throughout 
their business life, the time-series average of MERs is used in the cross-sectional computations. 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Sigma Skew Kurt 
Targets 
Total sample (6464) 1.45 1.41 0.00 7.51 0.69 0.49 4.09 
Equity (3565) 1.73 1.73 0.00 7.51 0.65 0.48 5.29 
Bond (2051) 1.12 1.00 0.00 5.38 0.54 0.72 5.12 
Money Market (417) 0.57 0.53 0.00 1.75 0.30 1.35 5.57 
Hybrid (407) 1.50 1.46 0.00 4.09 0.59 0.07 3.08 
Convertibles (24) 1.52 1.68 0.25 2.25 0.64 -0.65 2.14 
Merged entities 
Total sample (4307) 1.34 1.28 0.00 3.82 0.60 0.32 2.50 
Equity (2417) 1.59 1.54 0.13 3.82 0.56 0.20 2.62 
Bond (1279) 1.06 0.92 0.00 3.09 0.46 0.53 2.47 
Money Market (318) 0.60 0.55 0.11 1.70 0.31 1.21 5.01 
Hybrid (280) 1.30 1.25 0.00 2.40 0.54 0.02 2.21 
Convertibles (13) 1.57 1.52 0.82 2.20 0.45 -0.08 1.91 
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Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics on the income distributions of the targets and 
merged funds 
The table reports cross-sectional averages of time-series statistics for income distributions of target and 
merged funds. Income distributions include all types of distributions converted to percentages by dividing 
by Net Asset Value per share: capital gains, dividends and interest income. We calculate time-series 
statistics (number of data points, mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis) for each in-sample fund, and then we compute their cross-sectional averages. All numbers are in 
percentages except for n, skew, kurt. “n” stands for the number of funds involved in the calculations. “Total 
sample” for both target and merged funds includes all funds where only regular monthly returns and 
distribution information are available. We subdivide the sample into five subsamples according to their 
investment style. Thus, the number of cases only includes those funds where all three variables are 
available: returns, investment style and income distributions (941 targets and 638 merged funds). 
 n T Mean Median Min Max Sigma Skew Kurt 
 Target Funds 
Total Sample  2037 89 0.50 0.43 0.26 2.16 0.30 2.76 21.04 
Equity (16) 16 54 0.90 0.58 0.21 8.80 1.33 3.94 23.91 
Bond (858) 858 86 0.47 0.44 0.28 1.65 0.18 3.08 23.67 
Money Market (49) 49 110 0.36 0.35 0.14 0.67 0.13 0.30 2.69 
Hybrid (12) 12 63 0.53 0.27 0.18 10.54 1.31 5.68 42.00 
Convertibles (6) 6 71 0.53 0.53 0.28 2.34 0.29 1.40 11.95 
  Acquiring Funds 
Total Sample  848 60 0.64 0.45 0.26 2.35 0.56 1.97 11.69 
Equity (13) 13 39 0.64 0.28 0.19 4.82 1.10 2.27 8.57 
Bond (564) 564 61 0.45 0.40 0.27 1.19 0.17 1.98 11.60 
Money Market (47) 47 67 0.32 0.32 0.08 0.71 0.15 0.36 3.45 
Hybrid (13) 13 47 0.51 0.33 0.21 4.55 0.76 2.20 13.20 
Convertibles (1) 1 37 0.71 0.18 0.11 9.25 1.73 3.89 18.17 
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Table 3.6. SDF performance based on the Carhart model 
The first three columns report the median of SDF alphas for T (target) funds; Pre-B (pre-merger bidder) 
funds and Post-B (post-merger bidder) funds. All numbers are in percentages. “EQ” stands for Equity 
funds; “BD” stands for Bond funds; “MM” stands for Money market funds; “HY” stands for hybrid funds 
and “CV” stands for convertibles funds. The second panel reports paired tests of SDF alphas both between 
target and post-merger bidders and between pre-merger and post-merger bidders. The last column shows t- 
or z-statistics, testing the differences between SDF alphas depending on the normality or not of the 






 signify statistical significance based on the p-values at the 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. The SDF alphas results from GMM optimization of the 
orthogonality conditions on pricing errors. The SDF specification is linear in four factors: market, size, 
value and momentum. The weighting matrix is the estimator of the spectral density of moment conditions, 
and the window type employed is the quadratic spectral. 
  




Percentage of Negative 
Significant Alphas (%) 
Comparison tests 
between SDF alphas 
  
T Pre-B Post-B T Pre-B Post-B T Pre-B Post-B T/Post-B Pre-B/Post-B 
All 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.52 0.42 0.13 0.00 0.81 
60s 0.05 0.37 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - 
70s -0.22 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.00 11.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.51 -1.51 
80s 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.00 1.23 3.61 1.20 0.00 6.02 -1.76
*
 -1.00 
90s 0.10 0.16 0.04 0.32 1.22 0.24 0.57 1.55 2.75 0.38 2.86
***
 





EQ 0.12 0.32 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.27 0.00 - 1.05 
BD 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.00 -1.02 -1.02 
MM -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.24 0.00 0.00 7.14 3.81 1.90 1.01 - 
HY 0.20 0.30 -0.15 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 - 1.03 




Table 3.7. Distribution of SDF alphas over various post-M&A terms 
The table shows the SDF alphas estimated for various post-M&A terms of one to ten years. N stands for the 
number of observations for each term. Bottom stands for the poorest performing fund in the subsample, 
1%, 25%, Median, 75% and 99% stand for the corresponding percentiles of the alpha distributions; and Top 
stands for the best-performing fund in the subsample. Panel A shows the target funds SDF alpha results 
over the terms 1Y to 10Y. The abnormal performance is estimated using the stochastic discount factor 
approach using a subperiod, for each fund, corresponding to a specific term. For example, 1Y-SDF alphas 
for target funds are estimated using the data one year prior to the M&As. Panel B shows results for 
acquiring funds subsequent to the M&As. Panel C shows results for acquiring funds prior to the M&As. All 
numbers are in percentages except for n. 
   n Bottom 1% 25% Median 75% 99% Top 
Panel A: Target funds                 
1 Y  4445 -4.92 -2.71 -0.43 -0.11 0.21 1.89 5.65 
2 Y  4639 -4.50 -2.47 -0.47 -0.15 0.06 1.67 4.12 
3 Y  5133 -2.72 -1.86 -0.45 -0.18 0.01 0.99 2.40 
5 Y  4064 -2.82 -1.30 -0.36 -0.14 0.02 0.62 5.80 
7 Y  2953 -2.16 -1.24 -0.37 -0.11 0.05 0.43 3.58 
10 Y   1639 -2.18 -1.22 -0.36 -0.10 0.04 0.28 2.78 
Panel B: Acquiring funds (post- M&A )             
1 Y  4428 -5.09 -2.51 -0.38 -0.06 0.21 1.91 4.68 
2 Y  3718 -4.63 -2.16 -0.37 -0.08 0.16 1.75 3.81 
3 Y  3962 -2.23 -1.49 -0.27 -0.04 0.18 1.08 1.93 
5 Y  2902 -2.39 -1.12 -0.24 -0.07 0.09 0.72 2.43 
7 Y  1863 -1.58 -1.01 -0.18 0.00 0.16 0.79 2.39 
10 Y   892 -1.08 -0.92 -0.13 -0.01 0.10 0.31 1.70 
Panel C: Acquiring funds (pre- M&A)             
1 Y  4308 -5.16 -2.53 -0.29 -0.02 0.26 2.01 5.28 
2 Y  4518 -3.77 -1.86 -0.35 -0.06 0.15 1.41 3.23 
3 Y  5151 -2.31 -1.53 -0.31 -0.09 0.07 1.10 1.99 
5 Y  4295 -2.43 -1.17 -0.24 -0.07 0.09 0.93 2.21 
7 Y  3364 -1.93 -1.04 -0.24 -0.03 0.10 0.58 1.32 
10 Y   2159 -1.25 -0.81 -0.22 -0.04 0.07 0.34 1.44 
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Table 3.8. Median SDF alphas in each category for targets and post-merger bidders 
The table shows the median SDF alphas over terms ranging from 1 to 10 years for the whole sample, as well as by subsample divided according to: the decade at 
which the deal occurred; within versus across-family M&As; M&A deal size; and by target investment style. All numbers are in percentages except for p-values.  
 1Y 2 Y 3 Y 5 Y 7 Y 10 Y 
 T PostB p-value T PostB p-value T PostB p-value T PostB p-value T PostB p-value T PostB p-value 
All sample -0.11 -0.06 <0.01 -0.15 -0.08 <0.01 -0.18 -0.04 <0.01 -0.14 -0.07 <0.01 -0.11 0.01 <0.01 -0.10 -0.01 <0.01 
By the decade in which the M&A occurred 
1970s -0.11 -0.14 0.51 -0.64 0.05 0.37 -0.55 0.04 0.04 -0.17 -0.02 0.20 -0.32 0.01 0.18 -0.34 -0.01 0.41 
1980s -0.16 -0.03 0.98 0.06 -0.13 0.06 -0.13 0.05 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.73 -0.14 -0.04 1.00 -0.20 -0.36 0.58 
1990s -0.08 -0.08 0.94 -0.16 -0.15 0.41 -0.15 -0.10 <0.01 -0.10 -0.04 <0.01 -0.04 -0.02 <0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.28 
2000s -0.10 -0.04 0.01 -0.15 -0.05 <0.01 -0.20 -0.01 <0.01 -0.15 -0.03 <0.01 -0.12 0.08 <0.01 -0.11 - - 
By within vs across family M&As 
Within -0.09 -0.03 <0.01 -0.08 -0.03 <0.01 -0.13 0.01 <0.01 -0.09 0.08 <0.01 -0.04 0.16 <0.01 -0.03 - - 
Across -0.08 -0.05 0.49 -0.18 -0.01 <0.01 -0.20 0.02 <0.01 -0.15 -0.02 <0.01 -0.13 0.09 <0.01 -0.13 - - 
By the size of the M&A deal 
Bottom 10% -0.07 -0.06 0.76 -0.17 -0.18 0.98 -0.31 -0.10 <0.01 -0.27 -0.08 0.01 -0.25 0.12 0.01 -0.18 -0.23 1.00 
Bottom 30% -0.09 0.00 0.30 -0.17 -0.13 0.28 -0.30 -0.08 <0.01 -0.27 0.00 <0.01 -0.29 0.10 <0.01 -0.17 -0.06 0.41 
Top 30% -0.05 -0.07 0.30 -0.19 -0.09 <0.01 -0.32 -0.04 <0.01 -0.28 -0.05 <0.01 -0.34 0.01 <0.01 -0.55 -0.04 0.02 
Top 10% -0.03 -0.07 0.23 -0.17 -0.09 0.10 -0.37 -0.04 <0.01 -0.28 -0.04 <0.01 -0.45 0.00 <0.01 -0.31 0.06 0.33 
By target IS category 
EQ -0.21 -0.13 0.03 -0.29 -0.16 <0.01 -0.32 -0.15 <0.01 -0.29 -0.17 <0.01 -0.35 -0.23 <0.01 -0.40 -0.29 0.01 
BD 0.00 -0.01 0.96 -0.05 -0.02 0.25 -0.05 0.13 <0.01 0.02 0.09 <0.01 0.07 0.17 <0.01 0.05 0.11 0.01 
MM -0.07 -0.01 <0.01 -0.07 -0.02 <0.01 -0.06 -0.02 <0.01 -0.06 -0.02 <0.01 -0.05 -0.02 <0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 
HY -0.14 -0.11 0.95 -0.19 -0.13 0.05 -0.23 -0.12 <0.01 -0.19 -0.13 <0.01 -0.14 -0.11 0.21 -0.21 -0.03 <0.01 
CV -0.29 -0.21 0.48 -0.12 -0.15 0.51 -0.32 0.14 0.21 -0.26 -0.08 0.18 0.01 -0.17 0.44 -0.12 - 1.00 
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Table 3.9: Risk of the M&A participants 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the semi-variance of monthly returns for T (target) funds; Pre-
B (pre-merger bidder) funds; and Post-B (post-merger bidder) funds. All numbers, in the Risk metric panel, 
are in percentages except for Skewness and Kurtosis of the semi-variances. “EQ” stands for Equity funds; 
“BD” stands for Bond funds; “MM” stands for Money market funds; “HY” stands for hybrid funds and 
“CV” stands for convertibles funds. The “Paired tests” panel reports paired tests of fund risk measures both 
between target and post-M&A bidders and between post- and pre-M&A bidders. The second panel shows  







signify statistical significance based on the p-values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
  Median (%) Standard Deviation (%) Skewness Kurtosis 
Semi-variance of monthly returns 
 Fund 
type 
T Pre- B Post- B T Pre- B Post- B T Pre-B 
Post-
B 
T Pre-B Post-B 
All 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.56 0.38 0.53 6.95 7.16 4.34 95.47 92.97 40.11 
EQ 0.28 0.23 0.43 0.69 0.45 0.57 5.90 6.51 3.93 68.32 73.97 35.01 
BD 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.31 8.75 10.71 16.08 108.99 156.06 294.11 
MM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 1.54 17.20 15.98 5.17 318.21 278.80 
HY 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.30 12.88 10.00 3.18 216.32 147.79 22.05 
CV 0.08 0.05 0.24 0.32 1.10 0.38 3.71 1.80 1.31 17.39 4.42 3.74 
Paired tests: Comparison tests between SDF alphas 
z All EQ BD MM HY CV 60s 70s 80s 90s 00s 
T/Post-B -12.32*** -18.96*** -11.64*** 8.29*** -15.15*** -2.53*** 0.11 1.33 0.97 -2.70*** -13.15*** 
Pre-B/Post-
B 
-16.76*** -28.66*** 9.91*** 14.15*** -13.38*** -2.32** 0.33 -0.55 -0.94 -2.86*** -19.26*** 
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Table 3.10: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the independent variables, which are the pre-selected 
candidate indicators of mutual fund M&A success.  AgeT stands for target age (in years); AgeB stands for 
bidder fund age at the deal date (in years);  FlowT  is the average net asset flow of target funds one year 
prior to the M&A deal; MERB  stands for average expense ratio of acquiring funds post-M&A, MERT  is the 
average expense ratio of the target prior to the M&A;  σB  stands for the risk of the post-M&A bidder; σP  
stands for risk of the pre-M&A bidder;  σT  stands for the risk of the target; SizeB  stands for asset size of the 
acquiring fund, and  SizeT  stands for the asset size of the target at the M&A deal date. 
 
 AgeT AgeB FlowT MERB MERT σB σP σT SizeB SizeT 
Observations 6680 6626 4607 6273 6464 6680 6626 6680 4622 4621 
Mean 7.50 8.86 -0.94 1.31 1.45 4.68 3.48 3.91 378.59 43.98 
Median 6.25 7.08 -0.09 1.24 1.41 4.58 3.13 3.45 73.90 8.03 
Maximum 47.25 47.08 28.67 3.82 7.51 28.57 28.83 38.00 28679.40 3383.10 
Minimum 0.08 0.08 -237.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Std. Dev. 5.77 7.52 5.94 0.59 0.69 3.78 2.88 3.48 1160.90 145.08 
Skewness 2.18 1.92 -21.73 0.40 0.49 0.88 1.62 1.84 10.03 11.30 
Kurtosis 10.99 7.93 689.04 2.55 4.09 4.28 8.54 9.07 156.79 193.03 
 
 113 
 Table 3.11. Determinants of successful fund M&As  
The table reports the outcome of logistic regressions where dependent variable is the probability of M&A 
success. The independent variables are: AgeT stands for target age (in years); AgeP stands for bidder fund 
age at the M&A deal date (in years);   SIZEB  stands for asset size of the acquiring fund at the M&A deal 
date;  SizeT  stands for the asset size of the target at the M&A deal date;  MERB  stands for the average 
expense ratio of the acquiring fund post-M&A; MERT  stands for the average expense ratio of the target pre 
-M&A ; σB  stands for the risk of the post- M&A bidder; σP  stands for the risk of the pre- M&A bidder;  σT  
stands for the risk of the target; AlphaT stands for the past performance of the target fund over its lifetime; 
FlowT  is the average net asset flow of the target for the one year (or the corresponding term over which 
abnormal performance is estimated) prior to the M&A deal; IST stands for the investment style of the target; 
and Market stands for the state of the market at the time of the M&A deal conclusion. Family stands for the 






 signify statistical significance 
based on the p-values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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 13.89 -47.15 -73.47 
SIZET 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
SIZEB 0.00 0.00
*












 0.14 0.42 
Probability(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sample adjusted 6672 5559 3920 2310 746 218 
Included observations 2929 2504 1713 986 320 95 
Number of failures 1588 1347 949 549 170 49 
Number of successes 1341 1157 764 437 150 46 
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Table 3.12. Determinants of successful fund M&As for the seven-year subsample 
This table reports summary results for the logistic regressions when the dependent variable is the 
probability of merger success based on objective-adjusted returns post-M&A. The independent variables 
are: AgeT stands for target age (in years); AgeP stands for bidder fund age at the M&A deal date (in years);   
SIZEB  stands for asset size of the acquiring fund at the M&A deal date;  SizeT  stands for the asset size of 
the target at the M&A deal date;  MERB  stands for the average expense ratio of the acquiring fund post-
M&A; MERT  stands for the average expense ratio of the target pre -M&A ; σB  stands for the risk of the 
post- M&A bidder; σP  stands for the risk of the pre- M&A bidder;  σT  stands for the risk of the target; 
AlphaT stands for the past performance of the target fund over its lifetime; FlowT  is the average net asset 
flow of the target for the one year (or the corresponding term over which abnormal performance is 
estimated) prior to the M&A deal; IST stands for the investment style of the target; and Market stands for 
the state of the market at the time of the M&A deal conclusion. Family stands for the nature of the merger: 






 signify statistical significance based on the p-values at 
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Independent Variables Lifetime 1-year 2-years 3-years 5-years 7-years 









AgeT -0.12 0.23 0.19 0.30 0.32 0.19 
AgeP 0.35
***
 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.11 
AlphaT 0.74 1.23
**
 -0.38 0.60 -0.80 1.44
**
 









































 -45.40 75.83 
MERB -216.29
*
 -150.06 -68.75 -161.62 268.94 -73.47 














Market 0.20 -1.12 0.45 1.35
*







 0.86 0.42 
Probability(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sample adjusted 218 218 218 218 218 218 
Included observations 102 102 102 102 102 95 
Number of failures 49 40 61 64 63 49 
Number of successes 53 62 41 38 39 46 
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Table 3.13. Determinants of success using an alternative dependent variable 
The table reports the outcome of logistic regressions where dependent variable is the probability of merger 
success based on the SDF alphas post-M&A. The independent variables are: AgeT stands for target age (in 
years); AgeP stands for bidder fund age at the M&A deal date (in years);   SIZEB  stands for asset size of the 
acquiring fund at the M&A deal date;  SizeT  stands for the asset size of the target at the M&A deal date;  
MERB  stands for the average expense ratio of the acquiring fund post-M&A; MERT  stands for the average 
expense ratio of the target pre -M&A ; σB  stands for the risk of the post- M&A bidder; σP  stands for the 
risk of the pre- M&A bidder;  σT  stands for the risk of the target; AlphaT stands for the past performance of 
the target fund over its lifetime; FlowT  is the average net asset flow of the target for the one year (or the 
corresponding term over which abnormal performance is estimated) prior to the M&A deal; IST stands for 
the investment style of the target; and Market stands for the state of the market at the time of the M&A deal 






 signify statistical significance based on the p-values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Independent Variables Lifetime 1-year 2-years 3-years 5-years 7-years 
C -1.75 -0.11 -4.80* 11.485*** -1.46 2.17 
AgeT 0.53 0.25 0.02 -0.14* 0.48** -0.05 
AgeP 0.23* 0.02 0.03 -0.12 0.07 -0.06 
AlphaT 0.56 -0.92* 3.66*** 4.50* -0.89 1.12 
FlowT 1.32* -0.16 -1.72** -0.04 1.52** 0.02 
IST -2.91* -1.13** -0.57 -5.01*** -3.81** -0.62* 
RiskT 1.38 0.48* 2.89*** -1.35** -1.17 -0.34 
RiskB -2.91*** -1.31*** -0.47 -0.08 -1.80** -0.05 
RiskP 1.77 0.62* -3.24*** -1.14* 2.11 -0.02 
MERT 35.08 266.32 -45.28 -550.35*** -38.72 -214.43** 
MERB 1.04 -197.13 398.02*** 651.34*** 246.73 272.19** 
SIZET 0.00 0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
SIZEB 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
Market -0.01 -0.37 1.01 2.48* 0.18 1.76*** 
Family 2.42*** -0.24 2.71*** -† 1.51 -‡ 
Probability(LR stat) 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
Sample adjusted 218 218 218 218 218 218 
Included observations 102 102 102 125 102 114 
Number of failures 17 39 31 30 31 28 
Number of successes 85 63 71 95 71 86 
† When the dummy variable Family is included in the regression, the triangular matrix is too small, making 
the estimation of the coefficients inaccurate. 
‡ When the dummy variable Family is included, it (quasi) perfectly predicts binary response success if it 
takes a value of 1 (within-family M&A). 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics for the monthly returns and net fund flows for the sample of U.S. equity mutual funds 
The table reports the 1st, 5th, 50th, 95th and 99th percentiles of monthly returns and net fund flows, and the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of each distribution. All returns 
statistics are in percentages, and fund flows are in millions of U.S. dollars.  The pre- and post-event statistics are calculated over the same number of months as the corresponding 
event for the sake of comparability. Peer-adjusted variables refer to fund returns or fund flows minus the corresponding returns or fund flows for a size-weighted portfolio of the 
funds with the same investment objective. “Early 2000 Recession” stands for the economic recession starting March 2001 and ending November 2001. “Great Recession” stands 
for the economic recession starting December 2007 and ending in June 2009. All the p-values for Jarque-Bera tests for the normality of the return and fund-flow series are close to 
zero (<0.001). 




Pre-Early 2000 Recession -9.36 -4.67 -0.78 2.33 3.31 2.37 -1.34 8.36 
Pre-Great Recession -2.26 -0.63 0.66 1.55 2.25 0.74 -1.64 11.11 
During-Early 2000 Recession -3.24 -2.21 -0.66 0.94 1.71 1.01 -0.76 9.58 
During-Great Recession -5.08 -3.32 -2.00 -1.22 -0.62 0.73 -1.63 10.54 
Post-Early 2000 Recession -5.67 -3.98 -1.98 0.31 1.88 1.44 0.36 7.53 





Pre-Early 2000 Recession -188.71 -34.09 -0.04 16.68 57.14 42.18 -7.67 91.49 
Pre-Great Recession -179.97 -43.49 -0.24 20.99 112.86 47.03 -6.60 99.53 
During-Early 2000 Recession -10.43 -1.19 0.95 47.91 177.25 35.30 6.64 62.46 
During-Great Recession -115.83 -33.97 -0.21 30.83 151.24 44.34 3.56 81.15 
Post-Early 2000 Recession -184.64 -42.08 -0.31 10.80 62.07 41.07 -6.39 83.12 





Pre-Early 2000 Recession -4.27 -2.32 0.03 2.53 4.16 1.54 -0.22 7.70 
Pre-Great Recession -1.86 -0.80 -0.02 0.66 1.42 0.51 -0.85 9.21 
During-Early 2000 Recession -2.41 -1.29 -0.01 1.28 2.17 0.83 -0.93 10.55 
During-Great Recession -1.86 -0.88 -0.02 0.68 1.15 0.57 -2.29 21.65 
Post-Early 2000 Recession -3.64 -2.14 -0.14 1.43 2.21 1.09 -0.79 9.06 






Pre-Early 2000 Recession -71.73 -9.53 82.89 281.98 1940.00 263.69 6.96 61.10 
Pre-Great Recession -104.67 -4.14 61.64 232.46 438.77 152.30 8.42 117.68 
During-Early 2000 Recession -167.08 -166.60 -74.90 -8.88 82.09 55.18 0.97 8.50 
During-Great Recession -413.13 -389.36 2.37 96.71 193.56 138.29 -1.56 5.79 
Post-Early 2000 Recession -148.35 -84.59 50.71 219.85 407.07 118.65 1.72 13.27 
Post-Great Recession -1053.47 -1037.57 4.93 157.05 210.74 339.40 -1.81 5.29 
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Table 4.2. Non- and parametric correlation measures between within-recessionary period returns and post-recessionary 
period fund flows 
  Early 2000 Recession Great Recession 
 Pearson p Spearman p Kendall p Pearson p Spearman p Kendall p 
Absolute Variables 
All 0.09 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.81 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Small-Growth 0.12 0.05 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.00 -0.09 0.26 -0.13 0.11 -0.09 0.08 
Small-Core 0.02 0.74 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.33 -0.16 0.03 -0.11 0.03 
Small-Value 0.03 0.77 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.45 0.02 0.84 0.01 0.88 
Mid-Growth 0.18 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.60 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.23 
Mid-Core -0.05 0.50 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.50 0.11 0.26 0.07 0.28 
Mid-Value -0.13 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.09 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.38 0.00 0.28 0.00 
Large-Growth 0.04 0.44 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.66 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.07 
Large-Core -0.04 0.41 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.63 -0.06 0.37 -0.04 0.37 
Large-Value 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.92 -0.02 0.81 -0.01 0.79 
Multi-Growth 0.00 0.97 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.60 0.25 0.01 0.18 0.00 
Multi-Core 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.84 0.04 0.71 0.02 0.71 
Multi-Value 0.16 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.77 0.20 0.07 0.12 0.11 
Objective-Adjusted Variables 
All -0.12 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Small-Growth -0.01 0.91 -0.01 0.87 0.00 0.91 -0.14 0.08 -0.10 0.22 -0.06 0.23 
Small-Core -0.17 0.01 -0.15 0.01 -0.10 0.02 -0.03 0.65 -0.10 0.17 -0.07 0.16 
Small-Value -0.01 0.94 -0.03 0.76 -0.02 0.79 -0.03 0.83 0.11 0.35 0.08 0.30 
Mid-Growth -0.02 0.75 -0.07 0.28 -0.05 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.20 0.09 0.17 
Mid-Core 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.59 0.03 0.57 0.06 0.55 0.12 0.21 0.08 0.24 
Mid-Value 0.05 0.65 0.09 0.42 0.06 0.45 -0.29 0.03 -0.22 0.10 -0.15 0.12 
Large-Growth -0.10 0.03 -0.16 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.35 0.00 0.03 0.64 0.03 0.59 
Large-Core -0.04 0.37 -0.10 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.18 0.01 -0.05 0.44 -0.04 0.41 
Large-Value 0.00 0.99 0.02 0.80 0.01 0.82 -0.13 0.11 -0.10 0.23 -0.06 0.26 
Multi-Growth -0.37 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.18 0.01 
Multi-Core -0.08 0.27 0.02 0.80 0.01 0.81 -0.17 0.08 0.09 0.37 0.06 0.38 
Multi-Value 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.01 -0.11 0.34 -0.02 0.88 -0.02 0.77 
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Table 4.3. Bootstrapped Gaussian copulas for during-recessionary period returns and 
post-recessionary period fund flows  
In this table, ‘1% Left-tail’ stands for the first percentile of the distribution of returns. 
 1% Left-tail 5% Left-tail 10% Left-tail 10% Right-tail 5% Right-tail 1% Right-tail 
Absolute Variables 
Early 2000 Recession (March 2001-Novembre 2001) 
min -0.30 -0.14 -0.10 -0.13 -0.08 -0.72 
1st Qrtl -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.40 
median 0.15 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.28 
3rd Qrtl 0.40 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.13 
max 0.74 0.34 0.17 0.04 0.15 0.17 
Great Recession (December 2007-June 2009) 
min -0.49 -0.09 -0.15 -0.21 -0.24 -0.61 
1st Qrtl 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.09 -0.11 
median 0.14 0.02 -0.05 0.11 0.14 0.02 
3rd Qrtl 0.31 0.07 -0.03 0.14 0.18 0.23 
max 0.81 0.24 0.04 0.39 0.42 0.95 
Objective-adjusted Variables 
 
Early 2000 Recession (March 2001-Novembre 2001) 
min -0.62 -0.43 -0.28 -0.13 -0.22 -0.56 
1st Qrtl -0.28 -0.23 -0.14 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 
median -0.16 -0.17 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 
3rd Qrtl -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.05 
max 0.26 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.37 
Great Recession (December 2007-June 2009) 
min -0.97 -0.20 -0.13 -0.36 -0.54 -0.81 
1st Qrtl -0.61 -0.11 -0.06 -0.13 -0.28 -0.38 
median -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.21 -0.23 
3rd Qrtl 0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 -0.07 
max 0.79 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.31 
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Table 4.4. Dependence between within-recessionary period fund returns and post-
recessionary period fund flows 
This table is a recap of the signs (+ or -) of the relationship between the variables, if any, or independence (Ø), for 
the whole sample as well as fund categories, assessed at the 1% level of significance for the copulas and survival 
copulas analyses. 
 Early 2000 Recession Great Recession 
 Absolute variables Objective-adjusted 
variables 
Absolute variables Objective-adjusted 
variables 
COPULAS: 1% level 
All + + Ø Ø 
Small-Growth + + - - 
Small-Core + + - - 
Small-Value Ø Ø Ø Ø 
Mid-Growth + + - Ø 
Mid-Core + + - Ø 
Mid-Value + Ø Ø - 
Large-Growth Ø Ø Ø + 
Large-Core Ø Ø Ø - 
Large-Value + + Ø - 
Multi-Growth - - Ø Ø 
Multi-Core + + Ø + 
Multi-Value + Ø Ø Ø 
SURVIVAL COPULAS: 1% level 
All + - + Ø 
Small-Growth + + + + 
Small-Core + + + Ø 
Small-Value - - Ø Ø 
Mid-Growth + Ø + Ø 
Mid-Core + + Ø Ø 
Mid-Value Ø Ø Ø - 
Large-Growth + - + - 
Large-Core + + + Ø 
Large-Value + + + Ø 
Multi-Growth + - Ø Ø 
Multi-Core + + Ø - 

















Figure 2.1. Hansen-Jagannathan distances under (un)conditional setting 
Hansen-Jagannathan distances have been calculated as in Hansen-Jagannathan (1997). Uncond 
stands for Unconditional setting and Cond stands for conditional setting. CAPM stands for the 
single-factor linear pricing kernel. FAFR stands for the three-factor Fama-French model. APT 
stands for the arbitrage pricing theory-based model. LCAPM stands for the Jagannathan and 
Wang (1996) labor-CAPM. WML stands for the four-factor Carhart model. CUB stands for the 
non linear cokurtosis-based model as proposed by Dittmar (2002). QUAD stands for the non-
linear coskewness-based model as proposed by Harvey and Siddique (2000). LCUB and LQUAD 
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Figure 2.2. Hansen-Jagannathan boundaries and empirical stochastic discount 
factors for the nine candidate models under (un)conditional settings 
The sample consists of equity funds that reported at least 180 monthly returns. CAPM stands for 
the single-factor linear pricing kernel. FAFR stands for the three-factor Fama-French model. APT 
stands for the arbitrage pricing theory-based model. JW stands for the Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996) labor-CAPM. WML stands for the four-factor Carhart model. CUB stands for the non 
linear cokurtosis-based model as proposed by Dittmar (2002). QUAD stands for the non-linear 
coskewness-based model as proposed by Harvey and Siddique (2000). CUBLABOR and 
QUADLABOR represent labor-cubic and labor-quadratic models respectively, as proposed by 





























Figure 2.3. Average absolute pricing errors 
Averge absolute pricing error is the second ranking criterion of the candidate models. The scatter 
plots represent the cross-section mean of the average absolute errors or AAEs for all equity and 
bond funds. Uncond stands for Unconditional setting and Cond stands for conditional setting. 
CAPM stands for the single-factor linear pricing kernel. FAFR stands for the three-factor Fama-
French model. APT stands for the arbitrage pricing theory-based model. LCAPM stands for the 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) labor-CAPM. WML stands for the four-factor Carhart model. 
CUB stands for the non linear cokurtosis-based model as proposed by Dittmar (2002). QUAD 
stands for the non-linear coskewness-based model as proposed by Harvey and Siddique (2000). 
LCUB and LQUAD represent labor-cubic and labor-quadratic models respectively, as proposed 
by Fletcher and Forbes (2004). 
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Figure 2.4. Empirical density functions of the average abnormal performances for 
the nine candidate models for equity funds under the (un)conditional settings. 
The sample consists of equity funds that reported at least 180 monthly returns. CAPM stands for 
the single-factor linear pricing kernel. FAFR stands for the three-factor Fama-French model. APT 
stands for the arbitrage pricing theory-based model. LCAPM stands for the Jagannathan and 
Wang (1996) labor-CAPM. WML stands for the four-factor Carhart model. CUBIC stands for the 
non linear cokurtosis-based model as proposed by Dittmar (2002). QUADRATIC stands for the 
non-linear coskewness-based model as proposed by Harvey and Siddique (2000). CUBIC 
LABOR and QUADRATIC LABOR represent labor-cubic and labor-quadratic models 
respectively, as proposed by Fletcher and Forbes (2004). 
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Figure 2.5. Hansen-Jagannathan boundaries and empirical stochastic discount 
factors for bond funds for the four-index candidate model under (un)conditional 
settings. 
The samples consist of equity and bond funds that reported at least 180 monthly returns. FOUR-
INDEX stands for the four-index model. The four factors in this model are: the stock market 
portfolio, the size portfolio, the value portfolio and the broad-based bond market portfolio. (UN) 
stands for unconditional version, whereas (COND) stands for conditional setting. The covered 


















Figure 2.6. Average Absolute Error and Hansen-Jagannathan distances for equity 
















































Figure 3.1. Probability distribution of Sharpe-like ratios 
The figure represents the probability distribution of the ratios of SDF alphas over the lifetime of the funds 
and the square root of semi-variances of monthly returns for target, pre- and post-M&A bidders. 
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Figure 3.2. Distributions of Sharpe-like ratios over various periods post-M&A 
Each figure represents the probability distribution of the ratios of SDF alphas and the 
square root of semi-variances of monthly returns for target, pre- and post-M&A bidders 
for terms from 1 year to 10 years. 
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Figure 3.3. Risk-Return tradeoffs based on second-order stochastic dominance 
The figure represents the portfolio frontiers formed by the targets, pre- and post-M&A bidder firms. The x-
axis represents the square root of the semi-variances (risk) and the y-axis represents the SDF alphas (risk-
adjusted reward). All SDF alphas are considered regardless of their statistical significance.  
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Figure 3.4. Risk-return tradeoffs based on first-order stochastic dominance 
Each figure represents superposed cumulative distribution functions of significant alphas by levels of risk. 
Included in the bottom 10% are all cases of significant alphas for target and acquiring funds with levels of 
risks lower than the 10
th
  percentile of the downside risk distribution.  
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Figure 4.1. The distribution of copulas around the Early 2000 Recession 
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Figure 4.3. Joint cumulative distribution functions 
This set of figures shows the cumulative distribution functions of absolute and objective-adjusted monthly returns and 
fund flows around the Early 2000 Recession (Dot-Com Crisis) and Great Recession (Subprime Crisis) as well as the 
associated level curves at the 1%, 5%, 50% and 75% levels, for the whole sample of U.S. equity mutual funds. “In-
Ret” refers to within-recessionary period returns and “Post-FF” refers to post-recessionary period fund flows. 
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Figure 4.4. Level curves for the copulas and survival copulas 
This set of figures shows level curves at 1% for copulas and survival copulas of absolute and objective-adjusted 
variables around the Early 2000 Recession (Dot-Com Crisis) and Great Recession (Subprime Crisis). Each quadrant 
shows Fréchet bounds as well as the empirical curves at the 1% level for the whole sample of U.S. equity mutual funds. 
